State v. Robert Wesley Tibbitts
Background
- Tibbitts pled guilty to felony DUI and was sentenced to ten years (seven years determinate), suspended, and placed on probation.
- After two separate probation violations (one involving DUI and battery) the district court executed his sentence twice, each time crediting various periods of jail time; the court retained jurisdiction the first time and Tibbitts entered an IDOC retained-jurisdiction program.
- While in the retained-jurisdiction program the IDOC credited Tibbitts with 325 days; the district court later awarded an additional 5 days for a gap between release from the retained program and placement on probation, plus other presentence and post-warrant credits, totaling 268 days credited by the court.
- Tibbitts sought (1) additional credit under I.C. §§ 18-309 and 19-2603 for a total of 330 days (including the 325 days in retained jurisdiction), and (2) a Rule 35(b) reduction to allow participation in a domestic-violence treatment program.
- The district court denied credit for time served while in the IDOC retained-jurisdiction program and denied the Rule 35(b) motion; Tibbitts appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether district court erred by not crediting Tibbitts for 325 days spent in IDOC retained-jurisdiction program | Tibbitts: court should credit the 325 days (part of the 330-day total) | State: court lacks jurisdiction to award credit for time served while defendant is in IDOC custody under a retained-jurisdiction program | Court: affirmed — district court properly declined to credit retained-jurisdiction time; IDOC credited those days |
| Whether district court erred by denying 5 days credit for time between retained-program release and placement on probation | Tibbitts: those 5 days should be credited | State: court already credited appropriate presentence/post-warrant time | Court: affirmed — district court awarded the 5 days and other applicable credits; overall credits correct |
| Whether Rule 35(b) reduction should be granted to allow domestic-violence program participation | Tibbitts: domestic-violence program is distinct and might have rehabilitated him; merits leniency | State: no new information shown; repeated failures on community-based programs justify incarceration to protect society | Court: affirmed denial — no new information presented; court did not abuse discretion given public-protection focus |
| Whether appellate review can re-litigate original sentence absent new information | Tibbitts: sought leniency post-sentencing | State: Rule 35(b) requires new or additional information; appeal not vehicle to relitigate sentence | Court: affirmed — Rule 35(b) motion failed for lack of new information; sentencing discretion not abused |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Denny, 157 Idaho 217, 335 P.3d 62 (Ct. App. 2014) (credit-for-time-served is a question of law subject to appellate review)
- State v. Martin, 159 Idaho 860, 367 P.3d 255 (Ct. App. 2016) (courts lack jurisdiction to award credit for time in IDOC retained-jurisdiction custody; habeas corpus available to challenge IDOC calculations)
- State v. Knighton, 143 Idaho 318, 144 P.3d 23 (2006) (Rule 35(b) is a plea for leniency within court's discretion)
- State v. Allbee, 115 Idaho 845, 771 P.2d 66 (Ct. App. 1989) (Rule 35(b) discretionary leniency standard)
- State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 159 P.3d 838 (2007) (Rule 35(b) requires new or additional information to justify reduction)
- State v. Forde, 113 Idaho 21, 740 P.2d 63 (Ct. App. 1987) (review of Rule 35(b) considers entire record and original-sentencing reasonableness criteria)
- State v. Burdett, 134 Idaho 271, 1 P.3d 299 (Ct. App. 2000) (appellate review of sentence is for abuse of discretion)
- State v. Brown, 121 Idaho 385, 825 P.2d 482 (1992) (burden on appellant to show sentence unreasonable)
- State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 645 P.2d 323 (1982) (standards for when a sentence is an abuse of discretion)
- State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 650 P.2d 707 (Ct. App. 1982) (confinement reasonable when necessary to protect society and achieve sentencing goals)
- State v. Hunnel, 125 Idaho 623, 873 P.2d 877 (1994) (primary sentencing consideration is protection of society)
- State v. Pederson, 124 Idaho 179, 857 P.2d 658 (Ct. App. 1993) (other sentencing factors are subordinate to public-protection objective)