State v. Robbins
297 Neb. 503
| Neb. | 2017Background
- In 2002 Robbins strangled his girlfriend, pleaded guilty to second-degree murder, and was sentenced to 40–60 years.
- In 2012 Robbins sought postconviction relief, a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, and DNA testing under Nebraska’s DNA Testing Act after obtaining a buccal swab pharmacogenetic test showing he is an "intermediate metabolizer" of Zoloft.
- The pharmacogenetic report (administered by buccal swab years after the crime) indicated clinical significance: intermediate metabolizers may require lower doses to avoid adverse effects; experts testified that impaired metabolism can raise drug levels and has been associated in literature with suicidality and, more rarely, violence.
- The district court initially granted Robbins’ request for DNA testing under the Act, appointed counsel, and after briefing and hearing later dismissed Robbins’ asserted relief (finding the test results were not exculpatory or material to identity or guilt and did not show causal connection to the homicide).
- The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed whether the DNA Testing Act permits compelling DNA-based pharmacogenetic testing of a defendant to show altered culpability and whether such evidence is "exculpatory" under the Act; the Court found the Act does not authorize this form of testing and that such evidence is not exculpatory for purposes of the Act.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the DNA Testing Act authorizes DNA/pharmacogenetic testing of a defendant to determine drug metabolism (via buccal swab) | Robbins: Act applies because sample is biological DNA, defendant was in custody when swab taken, Act language does not limit use and metabolism shows he was a "different person" on Zoloft | State: Act targets testing of biological evidence tied to the crime scene/identity and requires state possession or chain-of-custody safeguards; not meant for testing defendant’s metabolic capacity | Held: Act does not authorize testing a defendant to determine metabolism; plain error to grant such testing under the Act |
| Whether pharmacogenetic evidence showing intermediate metabolism is "exculpatory" under the Act (i.e., material to guilt or identity) | Robbins: Test results are favorable and material to culpability, sentencing mitigation, and defenses (intent, intoxication, insanity) | State: Act’s purpose is identity/exoneration via DNA from crime-scene evidence; metabolic status does not change identity or exculpate guilt | Held: Evidence is not exculpatory under the Act because it does not bear on identity or likely produce a different trial result |
| Whether the district court’s initial grant of testing constituted reversible error | Robbins: entitlement to testing and further hearings based on new scientific evidence | State: Grant exceeded statutory scope; allowing such testing would expand Act beyond legislative intent and harm judicial integrity | Held: Grant was plain error; Supreme Court reversed and remanded with directions to dismiss |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Pratt, 287 Neb. 455 (2014) (interpreting DNA Act’s "integrity" requirement as protecting original physical composition of DNA evidence)
- State v. Winslow, 274 Neb. 427 (2007) (DNA testing may be ordered where testing of crime-scene biological material could exculpate or reduce culpability by excluding contributors)
- State v. Soukharith, 260 Neb. 478 (2000) (principles of statutory construction and interpretation)
- In re Estate of Morse, 248 Neb. 896 (1995) (plain-error standard and appellate review of errors not raised below)
