State v. Robbins, 297 Neb. 503

Background

In 2003 Randall R. Robbins pleaded guilty to second-degree murder and was sentenced to 40–60 years for strangling his girlfriend, Brittany Eurek.
In 2012 Robbins sought postconviction relief, a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, and DNA testing under Nebraska’s DNA Testing Act; the court denied postconviction relief and a new-trial claim but granted DNA testing.
The court-ordered testing was a buccal-swab pharmacogenetic test (performed ~11 years after the crime) showing Robbins was an “intermediate metabolizer” of Zoloft, meaning standard doses could produce higher drug levels and potentially adverse effects.
Robbins argued the pharmacogenetic result could support defenses or mitigation (lack of intent, intoxication, or insanity) and thus was exculpatory or relevant to sentencing.
The State and experts disputed a causal link between intermediate metabolism of Zoloft and homicidal conduct; the district court later concluded the test results were not exculpatory and denied relief.
The Nebraska Supreme Court held that the DNA Testing Act does not authorize DNA-based pharmacogenetic testing of the defendant to prove metabolism and that such testing is not exculpatory under the Act; it found the trial court committed plain error in originally granting testing, reversed, and remanded with directions to dismiss.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Robbins)	Defendant's Argument (State)	Held
Whether the DNA Testing Act permits ordering DNA/pharmacogenetic testing of the defendant to determine drug metabolism	Act is not limited to identity testing; buccal-swab DNA for metabolism is permissible and material	The Act targets biological material tied to the crime and evidence in state custody for identity; metabolism testing falls outside the Act	Act does not authorize DNA testing of the defendant to determine drug metabolism; trial court erred in granting testing (plain error)
Whether pharmacogenetic evidence here is “exculpatory” under the Act	Intermediate metabolizer status is favorable and material to guilt or sentencing (may negate intent or mitigate culpability)	Evidence does not affect identity, cannot exculpate or exonerate under Act; it would not probably produce a different trial result	Pharmacogenetic evidence unrelated to identity is not exculpatory under the Act; it would not meet statutory standard
Whether the biological-material/integrity requirements of the Act encompass a buccal swab taken from the defendant to assess metabolism	DNA profile is stable; integrity/chain-of-custody requirements are satisfied; Act doesn’t expressly limit use	Legislative history and statute show focus on DNA tied to crime scene/victim and identity; inventory/possession language implies evidence the State secured	The Act’s integrity and possession requirements point to crime-scene evidence for identity testing, not defendant-only metabolism testing
Whether the district court’s grant of testing was reviewable and reversible	(implicit) court abused discretion in denying broader relief after testing results	(implicit) court acted within statutory bounds when later denying relief; initial grant was error	Supreme Court found plain error in granting testing and directed dismissal of Robbins’ motion under the Act

Key Cases Cited

State v. Winslow, 274 Neb. 427 (discussing when DNA testing can produce noncumulative, exculpatory evidence relevant to identity and sentencing mitigation)
State v. Pratt, 287 Neb. 455 (interpreting “integrity” and chain-of-custody language in Nebraska’s DNA Testing Act)
State v. Parmar, 283 Neb. 247 (standards for appellate review of statutory interpretation matters)
State v. Thompson, 294 Neb. 197 (statutory interpretation principles)
State v. Soukharith, 260 Neb. 478 (statutory construction guidance)
State v. Hernandez, 283 Neb. 423 (legislative-intent analysis)
State v. Buckman, 267 Neb. 505 (statutory construction precedent)
State v. Young, 287 Neb. 749 (burden and requirements under the DNA Testing Act)
Carmicheal v. Rollins, 280 Neb. 59 (definition of substantial right in appellate review)
In re Estate of Morse, 248 Neb. 896 (plain-error standard explained)