State v. Robbins, 297 Neb. 503

In 2003 Randall R. Robbins pleaded guilty to second-degree murder and was sentenced to 40–60 years for the strangulation death of his girlfriend, Brittany Eurek.
In 2012 Robbins (pro se) sought postconviction relief, a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, and DNA testing under Nebraska’s DNA Testing Act; the court denied most relief but initially granted DNA testing.
A buccal swab pharmacogenetic test (administered ~11 years after the crime) showed Robbins was an “intermediate metabolizer” of Zoloft, which experts explained could increase drug levels and (according to some literature) be associated with adverse effects including suicidality or, more rarely, violence.
Robbins argued the pharmacogenetic result could support defenses or mitigation (impaired ability to form intent, intoxication, or insanity) and thus fell within the Act as exculpatory DNA evidence.
The district court later dismissed Robbins’ DNA-testing motion on the merits; the Nebraska Supreme Court found the original grant of testing was plain error because the Act does not authorize testing of a defendant’s genetics merely to assess drug metabolism or culpability when identity is not at issue.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Nebraska’s DNA Testing Act authorizes buccal-swab pharmacogenetic testing to determine a defendant’s drug metabolism (not identity)	Robbins: Act permits testing because DNA profile is stable and Act does not limit use; metabolic genetics could show he was a "different person" on Zoloft and is material to guilt/mitigation	State: Act targets biological material tied to crime-scene evidence and identity; requires possession/chain-of-custody and integrity of original physical material	Held: Act does not authorize testing of a defendant’s genetics to assess metabolism or culpability when it does not bear on identity; district court’s grant was plain error
Whether pharmacogenetic results are "exculpatory evidence" under the Act (material to guilt or wrongful sentencing)	Robbins: Results are favorable and could contribute to defenses or mitigation, so they are material/exculpatory under the Act	State: Act is aimed at proving innocence/identity; testing must be material to identity or exclusion of contributors and therefore the metabolism evidence is not exculpatory under the statute	Held: Evidence about metabolism is not exculpatory under the Act because it does not affect identity or likely produce a substantially different trial result

State v. Winslow, 274 Neb. 427, 740 N.W.2d 794 (Neb. 2007) (DNA testing statute applies where testing can exclude contributors and be materially favorable to defendant)
State v. Pratt, 287 Neb. 455, 842 N.W.2d 800 (Neb. 2014) (interpreting "integrity" requirement for DNA evidence retention and chain of custody under the Act)
State v. Soukharith, 260 Neb. 478, 618 N.W.2d 409 (Neb. 2000) (principles of statutory construction)
In re Estate of Morse, 248 Neb. 896, 540 N.W.2d 131 (Neb. 1995) (plain-error doctrine and when appellate courts may notice error)