State v. Robbins
297 Neb. 503
| Neb. | 2017Background
- In 2003 Randall R. Robbins pleaded guilty to second-degree murder and was sentenced to 40–60 years for strangling his girlfriend, Brittany Eurek. Robbins admitted the killing and made statements to investigators.
- Robbins had been prescribed a trial dose of Zoloft (50 mg) in March 2002; he testified he routinely took 50 mg but did not take it on the day of the homicide.
- In 2012 Robbins sought postconviction relief, a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, and DNA testing under Nebraska’s DNA Testing Act to obtain pharmacogenetic testing (a buccal swab) to determine his metabolic status for Zoloft.
- Pharmacogenetic testing showed Robbins was an “intermediate metabolizer,” meaning he may require lower-than-standard dosages; experts testified this could increase drug levels and, in rare reports, be associated with adverse effects including suicidality or violence, but no expert established a causal link to the homicide.
- The district court initially granted DNA testing under the Act; after further proceedings the court later dismissed Robbins’ motion for DNA testing and for a new trial/sentencing hearing. Robbins appealed; the Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed whether the DNA Testing Act allowed testing of this kind and whether the pharmacogenetic evidence was exculpatory under the Act.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Robbins) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Nebraska's DNA Testing Act authorizes DNA testing to determine a defendant's drug-metabolizer status (pharmacogenetic testing) | Act permits testing of biological material in custody; testing a defendant's DNA to show altered mental state while on medication is within Act's scope and could show diminished culpability | Act is aimed at forensic DNA linked to identity/crime-scene evidence; pharmacogenetic testing of the defendant does not concern original physical composition of evidence or identity and is not covered | Court held Act does not authorize pharmacogenetic testing of the defendant to determine metabolism; such testing is outside the Act’s intended scope (plain error in granting testing) |
| Whether pharmacogenetic evidence is "exculpatory" under the Act (material to guilt/identity or showing wrongful sentence) | The metabolizer result is favorable and could bear on intent, intoxication or insanity defenses or sentencing mitigation | Evidence does not exonerate or affect identity; Robbins admitted killing and testing cannot exclude him or materially change guilt/identity or wrongful-sentencing claim under Act | Court held metabolic-status evidence is not exculpatory under the Act because it does not relate to identity or likely produce a different result at trial |
| Whether the required "integrity"/chain-of-custody requirements of the Act apply to the pharmacogenetic sample taken years later | Buccal swab from an in-custody defendant is biologic material and stable; Act does not limit how evidence may be used | The Act’s integrity/chain-of-custody language contemplates physical evidence from the crime scene or evidence in the State's possession relevant to identity, not later-acquired samples for metabolic profiling | Court emphasized Act focuses on original physical composition of evidence tied to the crime scene or identity; metabolic-capacity testing does not meet statutory integrity or inventory requirements |
| Whether district court's grant of DNA testing constituted reversible error | Robbins argued district court properly applied Act and that testing might have affected plea/sentencing/defense presentation | State argued grant was outside Act and therefore plain error requiring reversal and dismissal | Court found plain error in the district court's initial grant, reversed, and remanded with directions to dismiss the DNA-testing motion |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Pratt, 287 Neb. 455 (interpretation of "integrity" requirement for DNA evidence under Nebraska's DNA Testing Act)
- State v. Winslow, 274 Neb. 427 (DNA testing may be ordered where testing could exclude a defendant and be favorable/ material to identity and sentencing)
- State v. Parmar, 283 Neb. 247 (statutory interpretation principles; appellate review of Act determinations)
- State v. Thompson, 294 Neb. 197 (standards for appellate review of statutory questions and trial-court fact findings)
- State v. Buckman, 267 Neb. 505 (statutory construction: consider statute as a whole and in pari materia)