State v. Robbins, 297 Neb. 503

Background

In 2003 Randall R. Robbins pleaded guilty to second-degree murder for strangling Brittany Eurek and was sentenced to 40–60 years. He admitted killing her at the scene.
In 2012 Robbins (pro se) sought postconviction relief, a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, and DNA testing under Nebraska’s DNA Testing Act (the Act). The district court denied the postconviction and newly discovered evidence claims but granted DNA testing.
The DNA testing ordered was a buccal swab pharmacogenetic test (performed ~11 years after the crime) showing Robbins is an “intermediate metabolizer” of Zoloft; experts disagreed about causal links between that status, Zoloft side effects, and violent behavior.
Robbins argued the pharmacogenetic/DNA results could support defenses (lack of intent, intoxication, insanity) or mitigation at sentencing and thus fit within the Act as exculpatory evidence.
The State and the district court treated the testing as governed by the DNA Testing Act; after briefing the district court later dismissed Robbins’ motion but this appeal followed. The Nebraska Supreme Court concluded the Act does not authorize testing of a defendant’s metabolism and held the district court committed plain error in originally granting the testing; the judgment is reversed and remanded with instructions to dismiss.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Robbins)	Defendant's Argument (State)	Held
Whether the DNA Testing Act authorizes DNA/pharmacogenetic testing of a defendant to determine drug metabolism	Act applies; buccal-swab DNA/profile is stable, testing is not limited to identity, and metabolic status can be material to guilt or sentencing	Act is focused on forensic DNA tied to identity (biological material from crime scene) and requires state-held evidence with preserved physical integrity	Held: Act does not authorize testing a defendant’s metabolism by buccal swab; such testing is outside the Act’s purpose
Whether metabolic-status evidence is “exculpatory” under the Act (material to guilt or identity)	Metabolic-status can show inability to form intent or support insanity/intoxication defenses or mitigation, so it is favorable and material	Evidence does not pertain to identity or exclude defendant; Act’s legislative history focuses on identity and proving innocence via DNA linking or excluding contributors	Held: Metabolic evidence is not exculpatory under the Act because it does not bear on identity or exoneration; testing would not probably produce a substantially different result at trial
Whether the DNA sample and test meet the Act’s integrity/possession requirements	The buccal sample is stable and the Act does not explicitly limit use of DNA to identity; results are reliable and relevant	The Act requires biological material be in state possession or retained under chain-of-custody–style conditions to safeguard original physical composition	Held: The metabolism information has no "original physical composition" preserved as contemplated by the Act; the integrity/possession requirements are not met
Whether granting testing was harmless or plain error	(implicit) Relief warranted because results could materially affect sentencing/defenses	District court’s grant of testing exceeded the Act; leaving that error uncorrected would expand the statute beyond legislative intent	Held: Granting the motion was plain error; reversal and dismissal required to protect statutory purpose and judicial integrity

Key Cases Cited

State v. Winslow, 274 Neb. 427 (discusses when DNA testing can produce noncumulative, exculpatory evidence and may affect culpability or sentencing)
State v. Pratt, 287 Neb. 455 (interprets Act’s “integrity” requirement as protection of original DNA composition and chain-of-custody concerns)
State v. Soukharith, 260 Neb. 478 (statutory construction principles for Nebraska criminal statutes)
State v. Buckman, 267 Neb. 505 (statutory interpretation guidance cited on legislative intent)