State v. Robbins
297 Neb. 503
Neb.2017Background
- In 2002 Robbins (then 17) strangled his girlfriend, pleaded guilty to second-degree murder, and was sentenced to 40–60 years. He admitted killing the victim.
- In 2012 Robbins sought postconviction relief, a new trial for newly discovered evidence, and DNA testing under Nebraska’s DNA Testing Act (Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-4116 et seq.). The court denied postconviction relief as time barred and denied a new-trial claim under the newly discovered evidence provision, but granted DNA testing.
- The court-ordered testing was a buccal swab pharmacogenetic test taken 11 years after the homicide to determine Robbins’ ability to metabolize Zoloft; results showed Robbins was an “intermediate metabolizer.”
- Expert testimony established that intermediate metabolizers can have higher blood levels of certain drugs and that adverse reactions (including suicidality and, in rare reports, violence) have been associated with antidepressants, but no expert established a causal link between Robbins’ metabolism and the homicide.
- The State argued, and the district court later held, that the DNA Testing Act is intended to test biological material tied to identity (chain-of-custody/integrity of evidence) and that pharmacogenetic testing of the defendant’s cheek swab does not produce exculpatory evidence under the Act.
- The Nebraska Supreme Court held that the district court plainly erred in granting the motion for DNA testing because the Act does not authorize testing the defendant’s own genetics for metabolism (unrelated to identity), reversed, and remanded with directions to dismiss.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Robbins) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-4116 et seq. authorizes DNA testing of a defendant to determine pharmacogenetic traits (metabolism of medication) | The Act does not limit testing to identity; testing a defendant’s DNA for metabolism is permitted and relevant to culpability/mitigation because it can show inability to form intent, intoxication, or insanity | The Act contemplates testing biological material tied to the crime and identity, preserved under chain-of-custody/integrity; testing the defendant’s own cheek swab for metabolism is outside the Act | The court held the Act does not authorize pharmacogenetic testing of a defendant for metabolism when it has no bearing on identity; testing was outside the Act |
| Whether pharmacogenetic evidence here is “exculpatory” under the Act (material to guilt or identity) | Metabolism evidence is favorable and material to culpability and sentencing mitigation, even if not exonerating identity | Exculpatory evidence under the Act must be material to guilt/identity; metabolism evidence does not affect identity nor probably produce a different result at trial | The court held the metabolism evidence is not exculpatory under the Act because it does not bear on identity or likely change the trial outcome |
| Whether the district court’s grant of testing was reviewable as plain error on appeal despite not being argued below | Implied: testing is proper; appellate review warranted | The State contended the grant was erroneous and remediable on appeal | The court exercised plain-error review, found the district court committed plain error in granting testing, and corrected it by reversal |
| Proper remedy where Act was misapplied | Allow testing and downstream hearings on mitigation/new trial | Dismiss motion as Act inapplicable | The court reversed and remanded with directions to dismiss the DNA-testing motion |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Winslow, 274 Neb. 427, 740 N.W.2d 794 (Neb. 2007) (DNA testing may be ordered when testing can exclude a contributor and produce noncumulative, exculpatory evidence relevant to identity and sentencing mitigation)
- State v. Pratt, 287 Neb. 455, 842 N.W.2d 800 (Neb. 2014) ("integrity" requirement in Nebraska DNA Act focuses on preservation of biological material linked to the crime/identity)
- State v. Parmar, 283 Neb. 247, 808 N.W.2d 623 (Neb. 2012) (standards for appellate review and statutory interpretation under the Act)
- State v. Thompson, 294 Neb. 197, 881 N.W.2d 609 (Neb. 2016) (statutory interpretation is reviewed de novo)
- In re Estate of Morse, 248 Neb. 896, 540 N.W.2d 131 (Neb. 1995) (plain-error doctrine and when appellate courts may correct errors not raised below)