State v. Robbins
297 Neb. 503
| Neb. | 2017Background
- In 2003 Randall R. Robbins pleaded guilty to second-degree murder and was sentenced to 40–60 years for the strangulation death of Brittany Eurek.
- In 2012 Robbins sought postconviction relief, a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, and DNA testing under Nebraska’s DNA Testing Act; the district court denied the relief claims but initially granted testing.
- A buccal swab pharmacogenetic test (conducted years after the crime) showed Robbins was an "intermediate metabolizer" of Zoloft, which experts said can increase drug levels and, in some reports, is associated with suicidal or violent adverse effects.
- Robbins argued the pharmacogenetic result could support defenses (lack of intent, intoxication, insanity) or mitigation at sentencing; he did not assert the test would show he was not the perpetrator.
- The State and the court analyzed whether the DNA Testing Act authorizes postconviction DNA sampling of the defendant himself to show metabolism-related evidence and whether such evidence is "exculpatory" under the Act.
- The Nebraska Supreme Court held the Act does not authorize this type of testing and that metabolism evidence unrelated to identity is not exculpatory under the Act; it found plain error in the district court’s prior grant of testing, reversed, and remanded with directions to dismiss.
Issues
| Issue | Robbins' Argument | State's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Nebraska's DNA Testing Act authorizes DNA testing of the defendant (buccal swab) to determine pharmacogenetics/metabolism | Act is broad; defendant remains in custody; testing of his DNA to show altered mental state is allowable because Act does not limit use to identity | Act targets DNA evidence tied to the crime scene or identity; statute requires biological material be in state custody and preserved to safeguard original physical composition | Act does not authorize testing of the defendant to determine drug metabolism; such testing is beyond the Act’s purpose |
| Whether pharmacogenetic evidence (metabolizer status) is "exculpatory" under the Act (material to guilt/identity) | Metabolism results are favorable and could show inability to form intent or support intoxication/insanity defenses or mitigation at sentencing | The test does not affect identity or exclude defendant as contributor; Act’s legislative history and text focus on identity; evidence is not material to guilt as defined by the Act | Metabolism evidence unrelated to identity is not "exculpatory" under the Act and would not probably produce a different outcome at trial |
| Whether the biological-material integrity/chain-of-custody requirements apply to this testing | Defendant argued DNA profile is invariant and custody/chain-of-custody concerns are irrelevant | The Act requires that evidence be in state custody or otherwise preserved to safeguard original physical composition (i.e., evidence tied to the crime scene and subject to inventory) | The integrity/chain-of-custody requirements mean the Act contemplates testing of crime-related biological evidence, not defendant sampling for pharmacogenetics |
| Whether district court’s grant of testing was reversible error | N/A (appellant sought testing) | District court erred in granting testing beyond statutory scope | Court found plain error in granting the motion and reversed with directions to dismiss |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Pratt, 287 Neb. 455 (construing "integrity" requirement and that DNA Act focuses on original physical composition of crime-related biological material)
- State v. Winslow, 274 Neb. 427 (DNA testing statute applied where testing could exclude contributors and produce noncumulative, exculpatory evidence relevant to identity and culpability)
- State v. Soukharith, 260 Neb. 478 (statutory construction principles)
- In re Estate of Morse, 248 Neb. 896 (plain-error doctrine and appellate review standards)