State v. Robbins, 297 Neb. 503

Background

In 2003 Randall R. Robbins pleaded guilty to second-degree murder for the 2002 strangulation death of Brittany Eurek and was sentenced to 40–60 years' imprisonment.
In 2012 Robbins sought postconviction relief, a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, and a new trial based on DNA testing (seeking pharmacogenetic testing via buccal swab to determine his metabolism of Zoloft).
Pharmacogenetic results showed Robbins was an "intermediate metabolizer" of Zoloft; experts testified this can increase drug levels and potentially increase adverse effects, but no causal link to homicidal behavior was established.
The district court initially granted Robbins' motion for DNA testing under Nebraska’s DNA Testing Act, but later denied relief after evidentiary hearings, concluding the test results were not exculpatory or material to identity or guilt.
The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed whether the DNA Testing Act authorizes testing of a defendant’s own DNA to determine drug metabolism and whether such results qualify as exculpatory under the Act; it found the Act does not cover this use and that the district court committed plain error in granting the motion.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Nebraska's DNA Testing Act authorizes postconviction DNA testing of a defendant to determine pharmacogenetic traits (metabolism of drugs)	Robbins: Act applies because sample is DNA, retained while in custody, and Act doesn't limit use; pharmacogenetic results could show diminished culpability or sentencing mitigation	State: Act is intended to test biological material connected to the crime (identity/forensic evidence) preserved by the State; metabolism is not an "original physical composition" of crime-related evidence	Court: Act does not authorize testing a defendant's own DNA to determine drug metabolism; such testing is outside the Act's purpose
Whether pharmacogenetic results are "exculpatory evidence" under the Act (material to guilt or identity)	Robbins: Intermediate metabolizer status is favorable and could establish defenses (inability to form intent, intoxication, insanity) or mitigation	State: Results do not affect identity, do not exonerate, and would not probably produce a different trial result	Court: Pharmacogenetic evidence unrelated to identity is not exculpatory under the Act; it would not likely change the result
Whether the district court plainly erred in granting Robbins' motion for DNA testing	Robbins implicitly: granting was proper under statute and legislative intent to provide innocence testing	State: granting exceeded statutory scope and legislative intent	Court: Granting was plain error because it extended the Act beyond legislative purpose and affected substantial rights; reversed and remanded with directions to dismiss
Applicability of legislative history and "integrity"/chain-of-custody requirements to the requested testing	Robbins: asserted integrity and custody requirements satisfied because DNA is stable and sample taken while in custody	State: Act’s "integrity" requirement contemplates crime-scene evidence retained by State and inventoried; buccal swab of defendant years later doesn’t meet that paradigm	Court: Act’s custody/integrity language and legislative history indicate testing targets evidence tied to identity/crime scene, not a defendant’s metabolic genotype

Key Cases Cited

State v. Pratt, 287 Neb. 455, 842 N.W.2d 800 (2014) (interpreting the Act’s "integrity" requirement to mean preservation of the original physical composition of biological material relevant to the crime)
State v. Winslow, 274 Neb. 427, 740 N.W.2d 794 (2007) (DNA testing may be ordered when it can produce noncumulative, exculpatory evidence relevant to identity or culpability)
State v. Soukharith, 260 Neb. 478, 618 N.W.2d 409 (2000) (statutory construction principles for interpreting criminal statutes)
In re Estate of Morse, 248 Neb. 896, 540 N.W.2d 131 (1995) (plain-error standard and its application)