State v. Rios, 156 A.3d 18

Background

Alberto Rios was convicted after a jury trial of first‑degree assault (use of a motor vehicle as a dangerous instrument), second‑degree assault (transferred intent causing injury to Jessica), and three counts of first‑degree reckless endangerment for conduct creating a risk of serious injury.
Facts: after threatening texts, Rios drove his car into Edwin Nunez and Jessica Sanchez; Nunez suffered serious injuries and Rios then exited the vehicle and punched Nunez. Rios testified he acted in self‑defense, believing Nunez reached for a gun.
Rios moved post‑verdict to set aside the verdict/new trial, arguing legal inconsistency between intentional assault convictions and a reckless endangerment conviction, and lack of notice because the state allegedly abandoned post‑crash theories pretrial.
Rios also challenged evidentiary rulings (cross‑examining him about another witness’s credibility and admission of tattoo evidence), the jury instruction on duty to retreat, and several prosecutorial statements as improper.
The trial court denied relief; the Appellate Court affirmed, holding (1) a plausible theory supported convictions for temporally distinct intentional and reckless acts, (2) Rios had constitutionally sufficient notice, (3) evidentiary errors (Singh violation and tattoo evidence) were harmless, (4) the duty to retreat claim was waived, and (5) claimed prosecutorial improprieties were not prejudicial.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Rios)	Held
Legal inconsistency between intentional assault convictions and reckless endangerment	Evidence supports separate crimes: intentional vehicle strike and subsequent reckless post‑crash punching; jury could convict on both	Convictions require mutually exclusive mental states as to the same act/result; verdicts inconsistent	Affirmed: plausible theory exists because distinct acts (vehicle strike vs. post‑crash punching) support different mental states
Notice / due process (state changed theory by amending information)	Amended information charged both intentional assault and reckless endangerment; evidence, closing, and charge presented both theories to the jury	State abandoned post‑crash theory by withdrawing earlier counts and focused trial on intentional conduct; lacked notice of reckless theory	Affirmed: defendant had sufficient notice—information, trial evidence, prosecutor’s closing, and jury charge supported conviction on post‑crash reckless conduct
Evidentiary rulings: asking defendant to opine on another witness’s credibility and admitting tattoos	Cross‑examination answers and tattoo testimony were in the record; even if improper, admission of defendant’s testimony permitted reliance in closing; tattoos rebutted defendant’s claim	Singh‑type question and tattoo evidence were improper and prejudicial	Error found as to questioning about another witness and assumed error as to tattoos, but both were harmless given strong state case and curative factors
Jury instruction on duty to retreat (subjective component)	Instruction overall conveyed subjective knowledge requirement though one sentence risked dilution; parties had opportunity to object	Instruction misstated the law by converting subjective knowledge to an objective standard	Held: claim waived under Kitchens (defense had draft charge and made no objection); plain error not shown because error was close and not manifestly unjust

Key Cases Cited

State v. King, 149 Conn. App. 361 (Conn. App. 2014) (Appellate Court decision on inconsistent verdicts later reversed by Supreme Court)
State v. King, 321 Conn. 135 (Conn. 2016) (Supreme Court: inconsistent‑verdict analysis focuses on statutory elements and whether any plausible view of evidence supports both convictions)
State v. Nash, 316 Conn. 651 (Conn. 2015) (two differing mental states permissible when they relate to different results)
State v. Singh, 259 Conn. 693 (Conn. 2002) (prohibits asking a witness to opine on another witness’s veracity)
State v. Ash, 231 Conn. 484 (Conn. 1994) (duty to retreat requires assessing defendant’s actual knowledge; subjective component explained)
State v. Calabrese, 279 Conn. 393 (Conn. 2006) (harmless‑error standard for evidentiary errors)
State v. Jones, 320 Conn. 22 (Conn. 2015) (cumulative prosecutorial improprieties can warrant reversal when combined with Singh violations)