State v. Riggs
301 Ga. 63
| Ga. | 2017Background
- Darren Riggs pled guilty to multiple charges including several sexual offenses (child molestation, statutory rape, enticing a child).
- Trial court imposed multiple 20-year sentences with varying portions to serve and portions probated; aggregate sentence totaled 50 years with 30 to serve.
- Riggs moved to reduce his sentence; trial court denied; Court of Appeals vacated sentences on counts that did not include split sentences as required by OCGA § 17-10-6.2(b).
- The State sought certiorari asking whether the split-sentence requirement applies to each sexual-offense count or only to the aggregate/final sentence.
- The Georgia Supreme Court held that OCGA § 17-10-6.2(b) requires a split sentence for each sexual-offense conviction and that trial courts may impose partially concurrent and partially consecutive (hybrid) sentences so probation periods can run concurrently with confinement on other counts.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether OCGA § 17-10-6.2(b) requires a split sentence for each sexual-offense conviction or only for the aggregate sentence | Riggs: statute requires split sentence on each sexual-offense count | State: split requirement applies only to the overall/final sentence, not each count | Held: applies to each sexual-offense count; statute’s singular language and sentencing principles require per-count split sentences |
| Whether trial courts can avoid the supposed absurdity of multiple split sentences by forbidding overlapping probation while imprisoned | Riggs: permissive of running probation concurrent with other confinement via sentencing discretion | State: multiple split sentences would create absurd logistics (release to probation then return to prison) | Held: no absurdity — trial courts may impose partially concurrent/partially consecutive (hybrid) sentences so probation can run concurrently with confinement on another count |
| Whether OCGA § 17-10-10(a) permits hybrid (partly concurrent/partly consecutive) sentences | Riggs: sentencing discretion and statute allow hybrid arrangements | State: statute contemplates only concurrent or consecutive sentences, not hybrids | Held: OCGA § 17-10-10(a) is broad and authorizes hybrid sentencing absent an express statutory limitation |
| Whether legislative history (unpassed bill) affects statutory construction | Riggs: statutory text controls; unpassed bills irrelevant | State: pointed to proposed bill suggesting legislature did not intend multiple independent probation periods | Held: unpassed House Bill 304 is not evidence of legislative intent; courts rely on enacted statutory text and context |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Randle, 298 Ga. 375 (Ga. 2016) (statutory construction requires reading text in natural context)
- Evans v. State, 300 Ga. 271 (Ga. 2016) (each count analyzed separately for sentencing/departure purposes)
- Rooney v. State, 287 Ga. 1 (Ga. 2010) (trial court discretion to make sentences concurrent or consecutive)
- Keller v. State, 275 Ga. 680 (Ga. 2002) (requirement to enter written sentence on each count for final judgment)
- Pless v. State, 282 Ga. 58 (Ga. 2007) (broad judicial discretion to impose reasonable probation/suspension conditions)
- Humphrey v. State, 297 Ga. 349 (Ga. 2015) (Paroles board authority preserved; courts cannot limit parole eligibility)