State v. Riggleman, 2014 Ohio 5369

David Riggleman was indicted in 2012 on two counts of fourth‑degree aggravated drug trafficking; a jury convicted him in April 2013.
Trial court originally sentenced Riggleman to consecutive 12‑month terms (2 years total); this court reversed and remanded for resentencing under R.C. 2929.13(B).
Riggleman was re‑sentenced on March 3, 2014 to the same two‑year prison term.
The statutory question involves R.C. 2929.13(B): amendments expanding exceptions to the presumption of community control (notably adding exceptions for organized criminal activity and committing an offense while under community control) became effective Sept. 29, 2013 — after the 2012 offenses but before the 2014 re‑sentencing.
Riggleman conceded the bond‑violation exception (which existed at the time of the offense) applied, but argued the court also relied on the later‑added exceptions, making application of those exceptions at re‑sentencing an unconstitutional ex post facto/retroactivity violation.
Majority held no ex post facto violation because the bond‑violation exception (available at the time of offense) supported the sentence and the court permissibly considered related facts (e.g., prior supervision, multiple sales) when sentencing.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether applying R.C. 2929.13(B) exceptions enacted after the offense (organized‑criminal‑activity and while‑on‑community‑control) to justify prison violated the Ex Post Facto and Ohio Retroactivity Clauses	State: sentence lawful because trial court relied on sentencing factors and exceptions, including ones valid at time of offense (bond‑violation), and courts may consider defendant's broader criminal history/facts	Riggleman: later amendments added exceptions that disqualified him from mandatory community control; using them at re‑sentencing was retroactive and increased punishment, violating ex post facto and Ohio Retroactivity Clause	Affirmed: no ex post facto violation because the bond‑violation exception (existing at the time of the offense) supported incarceration and the court permissibly considered facts beyond the conviction when exercising sentencing discretion. Dissent would remand for resentencing under the law in effect at offense time.

Lindsey v. Washington, 301 U.S. 397 (ex post facto protection against retroactive increases in punishment)
California Dept. of Corrections v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499 (speculative or attenuated possibility of increased punishment insufficient for ex post facto violation)
State v. Walls, 96 Ohio St.2d 437 (Ohio precedent on burden to show more than speculative chance of receiving lesser sentence under former law)
State v. Burton, 52 Ohio St.2d 21 (sentencing court may consider arrests and other unproven or uncharged conduct)
State v. Bowser, 186 Ohio App.3d 162 (trial courts may consider information beyond the conviction offense when sentencing)