State v. Richard W. Joy, III
221 So. 3d 1281
| Fla. Dist. Ct. App. | 2017Background
- Police pursuit ended in crash; driver fled, passenger Richard W. Joy III remained at the scene. A loaded handgun was found on the passenger-side floor where Joy’s feet would have been and cocaine in the center console. Joy was arrested.
- Joy was charged with trafficking in cocaine while armed and, separately (severed), possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (felon-in-possession).
- At trial on the trafficking charge, the jury convicted Joy of trafficking and found he "carried" a weapon but did not "actually possess" a firearm for purposes of the sentencing enhancement in section 775.087.
- Joy moved to dismiss the severed felon-in-possession count on collateral estoppel grounds, arguing the jury’s finding that he did not actually possess the firearm foreclosed prosecution under section 790.23. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed that count.
- The State appealed the dismissal; Joy cross-appealed asking for a new trial based on a requested special jury instruction (which the appellate court affirmed the denial of without further discussion). The appellate court reversed the dismissal and remanded for trial on the felon-in-possession count.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether collateral estoppel bars prosecution of felon-in-possession after jury found Joy did not "actually possess" a firearm in the trafficking trial | The State: collateral estoppel does not apply because the prior jury did not necessarily decide the possession issue for section 790.23; the jury found Joy "carried" the weapon, leaving open constructive/actual possession questions for the felon-in-possession statute | Joy: jury’s finding that he did not "actually possess" the firearm in the trafficking case necessarily precludes relitigation of possession under the felon-in-possession charge | Reversed dismissal. Collateral estoppel did not apply because the definitions of "carry"/"actually possess" (for sentencing enhancement) differ from possession under section 790.23; the prior verdict did not necessarily decide the issue in Joy’s favor |
| Whether the trial court erred in refusing Joy’s requested special jury instruction at the trafficking trial | Joy: the requested instruction was necessary and its denial merited a new trial | State: instruction was not required | Affirmed denial of the special instruction (no further discussion) |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Walthour, 876 So. 2d 594 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004) (standard of review for dismissal orders is de novo)
- Davis v. State, 645 So. 2d 66 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994) (burden on defendant to prove collateral estoppel by convincing, competent evidence)
- Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (U.S. 1970) (collateral estoppel prevents relitigation of issues necessarily determined)
- State v. Short, 513 So. 2d 679 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987) (collateral estoppel requires the issue to have been necessarily determined)
- Gragg v. State, 429 So. 2d 1204 (Fla. 1983) (prior jury must actually decide the factual issue when claiming collateral estoppel)
- James v. State, 16 So. 3d 322 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) (discussing definitions of "carry" and "possess")
- Bundrage v. State, 814 So. 2d 1133 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) (distinguishing "carry" from "actual possession" for enhancement)
- Daniels v. State, 718 So. 2d 1274 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998) (statute 790.23 may be established by actual or constructive possession)