State v. Rice, 346 P.3d 631

Two off‑duty deputies observed a station wagon driving erratically and reported a suspected drunk driver; later officers located the registered owner’s home and contacted defendant at about 11:20 a.m.
Deputy Sites smelled alcohol, observed glassy/slurred speech, and defendant admitted driving; Sites asked defendant to step outside and to open a locked storm door, which defendant refused and twice closed on the officer.
Sites attempted to force the storm door, called for backup, and at about 11:41 a.m. Sites unlatched the storm door through a window and then kicked in the interior door; defendant remained seated.
Officers did not seek a telephonic warrant; they believed they had probable cause and exigent circumstances to enter without a warrant to prevent loss or tampering of blood‑alcohol evidence.
Trial court denied defendant’s motion to suppress; defendant was convicted of DUII after a second trial and of interfering with a peace officer after the first trial.
On appeal the court reversed the DUII conviction for improper warrantless entry under Article I, §9 of the Oregon Constitution, but affirmed the interfering conviction (closing the door was not passive resistance).

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether officers could forcibly enter the home without a warrant under Article I, §9 (exigent circumstances)	State: exigent circumstances existed because delay to get a warrant would risk loss/tampering of blood‑alcohol evidence; Machuca supports no need to show inability to obtain warrant	Defendant: state must prove that time to obtain a warrant would have sacrificed evidence; forcible home entry differs from Machuca facts	Reversed: state failed to meet its burden under Sullivan—must prove waiting for a warrant would have sacrificed the evidence, and it did not here
Whether closing the door was "passive resistance" and thus not criminal under ORS 162.247(3)(b) (MJOA)	State: defendant’s conduct (closing/locking door against officer) was not passive resistance and supports conviction for interfering with a peace officer	Defendant: closing the door was nonviolent, noncooperative passive resistance commonly associated with protest/civil disobedience	Affirmed: a rational trier of fact could find the conduct was not a form of passive resistance as defined in Patnesky

State v. Machuca, 347 Or. 644, 227 P.3d 729 (court discussed exigent‑circumstances blood‑draw context) (state relied on this)
State v. Sullivan, 265 Or. App. 62, 333 P.3d 1201 (explains burden to show waiting for a warrant would sacrifice evidence; dispositive here)
State v. Bridewell, 306 Or. 231, 759 P.2d 1054 (warrantless entries are per se unreasonable; exceptions narrowly construed)
State v. Fair, 353 Or. 588, 302 P.3d 417 (home sanctity and degree of justification required for seizures)
State v. Ritz, 270 Or. App. 88, 347 P.3d 1052 (how state may prove exigency by showing time to obtain warrant and risk to evidence)
State v. Patnesky, 265 Or. App. 356, 335 P.3d 331 (defines "passive resistance" as acts commonly associated with protest/civil disobedience)