853 S.E.2d 334
S.C.2020Background
- Minor (alleged victim) reported sexual abuse by Jose Reyes Reyes that occurred when she was six; reported in Aug 2013; trial held when she was nine.
- Reyes was indicted for first-degree criminal sexual conduct with a minor; he testified and denied the allegations; jury convicted.
- No direct physical evidence of abuse; both Minor and Reyes tested positive for HSV‑1; medical testimony offered equivocal transmission explanations.
- At trial the State called Minor first; in the jury's presence the solicitor asked foundational questions about truth/lie and used first‑person phrasing (“we”); defense objected to bolstering.
- The trial court, in the jury’s presence, commented under Rule 601 that Minor was competent unless disqualified; defense preserved objection to bolstering.
- Court of Appeals affirmed; the South Carolina Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide (1) whether the in‑court competency colloquy/ruling in front of the jury was improper and (2) whether the solicitor’s first‑person questioning impermissibly bolstered Minor’s credibility.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the trial court improperly conducted/ruled on competency in front of the jury | Reyes: the colloquy and the court's remark that Minor was "competent unless otherwise disqualified" amounted to a competency hearing in view of the jury and impermissibly vouched for credibility | State: the court merely stated Rule 601 (presumption of competency) neutrally; no vouching | Court: a reasonable juror would not view the Rule 601 statement as indicating the judge believed Minor was truthful; no reversible error on that point |
| Whether the solicitor’s use of first‑person questions (“we”/“we're”) improperly bolstered the child witness | Reyes: first‑person phrasing signaled the prosecutor’s belief in the witness’s truthfulness and impermissibly vouched for credibility | State: foundational truth/lie questioning is appropriate for assessing a child witness; the Kelly line is distinguishable | Court: first‑person questions were improper (violated rule against bolstering) but error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the jury charge cured any prejudice |
| Whether any error was harmless given the evidence (HSV‑1, disclosures) | Reyes: errors harmed his right to a fair trial; evidence was not overwhelming | State: evidence (disclosures + HSV‑1 concordance) was overwhelming, so any error was harmless | Court: evidence was not overwhelming (medical testimony equivocal), but the court’s detailed credibility jury charge—especially instruction about evaluating child testimony—cured any prejudice; overall error harmless |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Pitts, 256 S.C. 420 (court determines witness competency is for the trial judge)
- Tappeiner v. State, 416 S.C. 239 (credibility is for the jury; court may not vouch)
- State v. Kelly, 343 S.C. 350 (first‑person questioning by prosecutor can improperly bolster witness credibility)
- Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (harmless‑error standard for constitutional errors)
- State v. Shuler, 344 S.C. 604 (asking a witness whether they will tell the truth does not necessarily constitute impermissible vouching)
