State v. Reu-El, 394 P.3d 884

Defendant King Phillip Amman Reu-El (formerly Phillip Cheatham) was retried after this Court reversed his first convictions for ineffective assistance of counsel; prior proceedings implicated double jeopardy and jurisdictional claims.
Before his second trial, Amman Reu‑El filed pro se habeas and repeatedly argued double jeopardy barred retrial or entitled him to immediate appellate review under Abney.
Days before trial he signed a written plea agreement and pleaded nolo contendere to capital murder and attempted murder; the agreement waived appeals except on jurisdiction or unlawful sentence and the State abandoned the death penalty.
At the plea colloquy the court explained the rights waived by a plea, warned that pretrial motions would be resolved and could not be raised again, and cautioned the plea could affect his pending habeas action.
After sentencing Amman Reu‑El moved to withdraw his plea asserting he was misled about his ability to continue pursuing double jeopardy claims; the district court denied the motion finding he had competent counsel, was not coerced or misled, and entered the plea knowingly.
On appeal to the Kansas Supreme Court, Amman Reu‑El argued he established good cause to withdraw the plea because counsel and the court misinformed him about post‑plea appellate rights regarding double jeopardy; the Supreme Court affirmed the denial.

Issue	Amman Reu‑El's Argument	State's Argument	Held
Whether district court abused discretion by denying presentence motion to withdraw plea	Plea was not knowing/voluntary because he was misinformed he could continue to pursue double jeopardy claims on direct appeal after a no contest plea	District court applied correct standards; record shows competent counsel, clear written waiver, and colloquy that warned plea would resolve prior motions	No abuse of discretion; denial affirmed
Whether counsel or judge misled defendant about effect of plea on double jeopardy appeals	Counsel and court created misleading impression that double jeopardy claims would survive plea or be appealable interlocutorily (Abney)	Written plea waived appeals except jurisdiction; counsel noted habeas and collateral remedies remained; court warned plea could affect habeas and left interlocutory issues to higher courts	No misleading misinformation; plea agreement, counsel statements, and colloquy collectively show defendant understood consequences

State v. Edgar, 281 Kan. 30 (2006) (sets factors for evaluating presentence plea withdrawal motions)
K.S.A. statutory framework interpreted in State v. White, 289 Kan. 279 (2009) (court may consider written plea, counsel advice, and colloquy together to determine understanding)
Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651 (1977) (federal collateral‑order exception allowed interlocutory appeal of double jeopardy dismissal)
United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563 (1989) (guilty plea waives nonjurisdictional defenses including double jeopardy)
State v. Cheatham, 296 Kan. 417 (2013) (prior reversal of defendant’s convictions for ineffective assistance of counsel)
Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970) (plea must be voluntary and knowing to be constitutionally valid)
In re Berkowitz, 3 Kan. App. 2d 726 (1979) (habeas corpus as a collateral remedy to challenge pretrial double jeopardy rulings)