State v. Rendon
2015 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 1413
| Tex. Crim. App. | 2015Background
- Detective Stover, investigating Rendon for drug activity, brought his trained narcotics dog (Baco) to Rendon’s apartment complex; Baco alerted first to Rendon’s car in the parking lot and then at the exterior of Rendon’s front door on the upstairs landing.
- Stover’s search-warrant affidavit relied on Baco’s alert to the “bottom left portion” of the front door; a warrant was issued and execution yielded marijuana and cash.
- Rendon moved to suppress, arguing the dog sniff at his door was an unlawful, warrantless search; the trial court granted suppression after finding the landing at the top of the stairs fell within the apartment’s curtilage.
- The court of appeals affirmed, applying Florida v. Jardines and holding the dog sniff at the apartment’s threshold exceeded any implied license and was a Fourth Amendment search.
- The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the court of appeals’ judgment but limited its holding: bringing a trained narcotics dog to the threshold/area immediately outside an apartment door to sniff for contraband is an unlicensed physical intrusion on the curtilage and thus a warrantless search under Jardines.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Rendon) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Did bringing a narcotics dog to the apartment door to sniff constitute a Fourth Amendment search? | The dog sniff was conducted from an area where officers had a right to be and a canine sniff is sui generis and not a search when done in a place open to the public. | The dog sniff occurred at the apartment threshold/curtilage and was a physical, unlicensed intrusion that produced the evidence used for the warrant. | Held: Yes. The dog sniff at the threshold/area immediately outside the apartment door was an unlicensed physical intrusion into the curtilage and therefore a Fourth Amendment search. |
| Was the landing/area where the sniff occurred part of the apartment’s curtilage? | Area was a common or public area of the complex and not protected curtilage. | The landing led only to Rendon’s door and was intimately linked to the home, so it was curtilage. | Narrow holding: the Court did not fully decide the broader curtilage boundary issue but concluded the sniff occurred at the door threshold—an area within curtilage for purposes of Jardines. |
| Was exclusion of dog-sniff-derived information fatal to probable cause for the warrant? | If the sniff was lawful, the alert supported probable cause and the warrant was valid. | If the sniff was unlawful, the alert must be excluded and remaining affidavit facts do not establish probable cause. | Held: Because the sniff was an unlawful search, the alert was excluded and the remaining affidavit lacked probable cause; suppression affirmed. |
| Should the Court resolve the case under privacy-expectation (Katz/Kyllo) rather than property/intrusion theory? | The State urged reliance on Katz or argued no search occurred. | Rendon relied on Jardines’ property/intrusion reasoning; concurrence noted Kyllo/Katz could also apply. | Court resolved the case on Jardines’ property-intrusion baseline and did not reach Katz/Kyllo analysis, though concurrence discussed Kyllo-type concerns. |
Key Cases Cited
- Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013) (use of a drug-detection dog on the front porch of a home was an unlicensed physical intrusion into the curtilage and a Fourth Amendment search)
- United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012) (property-based physical intrusion is a baseline Fourth Amendment search principle)
- Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984) (curtilage defined as area immediately surrounding and associated with the home; focus on intimate activities of domestic life)
- United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294 (1987) (four-factor test for curtilage: proximity, enclosure, use, and steps to protect from observation)
- Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test)
- Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001) (use of sense-enhancing technology not in general public use to explore the interior of the home is a search)
- United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983) (canine sniff of luggage at an airport was not a search under Fourth Amendment)
- Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005) (dog sniff during a lawful traffic stop did not constitute a Fourth Amendment search when it revealed only the presence of contraband)
- United States v. Burston, 806 F.3d 1123 (8th Cir.) (2015) (applying Jardines to conclude a drug-dog sniff near an apartment window invaded the curtilage)