State v. Remy, 308 Ga. 296

Paul Junior Remy was tried for the 2016 shooting death of Jenario Stark; after a full day of jury deliberations the trial court declared a mistrial.
Four days after the mistrial, Remy filed a motion for immunity under OCGA § 16-3-24.2, asserting he shot Stark in defense of himself/others. Remy is a convicted felon.
The State re-indicted Remy before the immunity hearing, removing one aggravated-assault count and adding a second, duplicative count for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.
The trial court granted Remy immunity on the self-defense claim and dismissed the second indictment sua sponte as untimely under a court-ordered deadline. The court vacated the felon-in-possession count in the original indictment and remanded for further consideration of whether possession was justified only during the period of necessity.
The State appealed, raising: (1) whether an immunity motion may be filed after a mistrial; (2) whether immunity was proper on the merits given Remy’s felon status; and (3) whether the trial court properly dismissed the second indictment.
Facts relied on by the trial court: Stark allegedly assaulted his girlfriend; Remy entered, struggled with Stark, observed a bulge and later a handgun, and fired one shot when Stark reached for the gun; Stark’s firearm was found under his body with the safety off.

Issue	State's Argument	Remy’s Argument	Held
1. May a defendant file a §16-3-24.2 immunity motion after a mistrial?	Immunity motions must be filed pretrial; Remy waited until after the jury completed a full trial cycle, so motion unavailable.	A mistrial places the defendant in a pretrial posture (as if no trial occurred), so an immunity motion may be filed afterward.	Held: Defendant may file an immunity motion after a mistrial; mistrial is equivalent to no trial.
2. Was Remy entitled to immunity on the merits despite being a convicted felon?	Remy’s status as a felon precludes immunity for deadly-force incidents under OCGA §16-3-21(b)(2).	After 2014 statutory amendments and §16-11-138, possession can be justified during necessity; Remy showed by a preponderance he acted in self-defense.	Held: Court affirmed immunity as to the homicide/aggravated-assault counts; but vacated and remanded the felon-in-possession count for further factfinding about whether possession was limited to the period of necessity.
3. Could the trial court sua sponte dismiss the second (re-)indictment as violating a court-filed deadline?	(State) Trial court dismissal was erroneous because court orders in the original case do not authorize dismissal of a separately returned indictment.	(Remy) Trial court acted within authority to protect proceedings? (arguing dismissal)	Held: Reversed; trial court lacked legal basis to dismiss the second indictment sua sponte on that ground.

State v. Burks, 285 Ga. 781 (discussing pre-2014 limits on felons seeking justification-based immunity)
Fair v. State, 284 Ga. 165 (motions for immunity should be considered pretrial when filed pretrial)
State v. Bunn, 288 Ga. 20 (standard of review and deference to trial court findings on immunity)
Goodson v. State, 305 Ga. 246 (defendant must prove justification by a preponderance to obtain immunity)
State v. Green, 289 Ga. 802 (example affirming immunity where decedent acted irrationally and attacked)
Beecher v. State, 240 Ga. App. 457 (mistrial consequences, including re-noticing prior convictions for retrial)
Augusta Ry. Co. v. Tennant, 98 Ga. 156 (mistrial is equivalent to no trial)
State v. Kelley, 298 Ga. 527 (limits on a court’s power to dismiss indictments without legal basis)
Edwards v. State, 281 Ga. 108 (court cannot override statutory indictment/prosecution procedures)
State v. Bachan, 321 Ga. App. 712 (circumstances in which a trial court may dismiss an indictment)