351 P.3d 127
Wash.2015Background
- In 2012 police observed marijuana plants at a Shorewood home, identified the resident as William Reis (through license plate and a 2005 booking photo), and obtained a warrant based on an affidavit describing prior grow operations and observed indicia of cultivation.
- Search pursuant to the warrant uncovered evidence of a grow operation (37 plants and ~211 ounces of cannabis); Reis was charged under Washington’s Uniform Controlled Substances Act (chapter 69.50 RCW).
- Reis moved to suppress, arguing the 2011 amendments to the Medical Use of Cannabis Act (MUCA, chapter 69.51A RCW) decriminalized medical cannabis use such that probable cause for a search could not exist. Trial court denied suppression; Court of Appeals affirmed.
- Key statutory background: 2011 amendments created a registry-based, tiered protection scheme (heightened protections for registered users; affirmative defenses for unregistered users). Section 901 would have created the registry but was vetoed by the governor; references to registration remain in the enacted RCW 69.51A.040.
- The central legal question: does RCW 69.51A.040 (as enacted after the veto) decriminalize medical cannabis use so that possession/cultivation is not a crime, or does the statute instead leave only an affirmative defense absent a registry?
- The Supreme Court held the statute does not decriminalize medical use because compliance is impossible without the vetoed registry; thus MUCA currently provides only an affirmative defense and does not negate probable cause for the search warrant.
Issues
| Issue | Reis's Argument | State's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether RCW 69.51A.040 decriminalizes medical cannabis use as a noncrime | RCW 69.51A.040 says "medical use ... does not constitute a crime," so medical use is lawful and cannot support probable cause | The statute requires compliance with terms (including registration); because the registry was vetoed and cannot be complied with, the statute does not decriminalize use but instead leaves an affirmative defense | Held: RCW 69.51A.040 does not decriminalize medical use absent a registry; it establishes elements for heightened protection but, given the veto, only an affirmative defense is available now |
| Whether references to the vetoed registry must be ignored so statute is interpreted as decriminalizing use | Reis: the governor’s veto of the registry should mean surviving references are meaningless; interpret statute as decriminalizing use | State: references to registry remain in enacted text and must be given effect; court may not rewrite statute or omit language not itself vetoed | Held: Court must interpret enacted statute as written; it cannot strike or rewrite surviving references—registration requirement remains operative though impossible to satisfy, so affirmative defense framework governs |
| Whether an affirmative defense undermines probable cause for a search warrant | Reis: if medical use is lawful, probable cause is negated | State: availability of an affirmative defense does not negate probable cause | Held: An affirmative defense does not defeat probable cause; search warrant valid |
| Whether court may remedy the statutory gap created by the veto | Reis: court should interpret statute to avoid absurd result and treat medical use as lawful | State: judicial modification would usurp legislative power | Held: Court may not rewrite or supply omitted registry; remedy belongs to legislature; must apply statute as enacted |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Kurtz, 178 Wn.2d 466 (2013) (discusses whether 2011 amendments made qualifying marijuana use a legal use rather than only an affirmative defense)
- State v. Fry, 168 Wn.2d 1 (2010) (availability of an affirmative defense does not negate probable cause for a search warrant)
- State v. Martin, 94 Wn.2d 1 (1980) (courts may not read into a statute what the legislature omitted)
- Washington Fed. of State Employees v. State, 101 Wn.2d 536 (1984) (addressed effects of veto and treatment of references to vetoed material)
- Hallin v. Trent, 94 Wn.2d 671 (1980) (governor acts in legislative capacity when vetoing; vetoed material to be treated as never enacted)
