State v. Reese, 2019 Ohio 4670

Shawn Reese was indicted in two separate Cuyahoga County cases: a murder case (CR-18-624729) and an aggravated robbery case (CR-17-624420); both assigned to the same judge and set for trial in August 2018.
At a pretrial on August 8, the court indicated the aggravated robbery would be tried first (August 13) and the murder trial would follow.
On the morning of August 13 Reese told the court he was surprised the aggravated robbery was being tried first and complained his counsel was not acting in his interests; the judge expressed disbelief at some of Reese’s statements.
The court denied Reese’s request for a continuance or new counsel; Reese pleaded guilty in the aggravated robbery case, waived a jury in the murder case, and was tried to the bench the next day and convicted on all counts.
Reese appealed, arguing (1) judicial bias based on the judge’s August 13 comments and (2) ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to raise that bias. The appellate court affirmed convictions but remanded for a nunc pro tunc correction to the sentencing entry to reflect consecutive-sentence findings.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Judicial bias of trial judge	State: Judge’s remarks were proper judicial observations and did not require recusal	Reese: Judge’s statements that he disbelieved Reese showed deep-seated antagonism making fair judgment impossible	Court: Overruled — judge’s comments arose from courtroom events, did not show deep-seated bias; presumption of impartiality not overcome
Ineffective assistance for failing to object to judicial bias	State: Counsel’s failure to object did not prejudice because no bias existed	Reese: Counsel was ineffective for not preserving the bias claim	Court: Overruled — because no bias shown, counsel had no meritorious objection to make
Sentencing entry omission	N/A	N/A	Court: Affirmed convictions but remanded for nunc pro tunc entry to incorporate consecutive-sentencing findings (per Bonnell)

State v. Dean, 127 Ohio St.3d 140 (2010) (defines judicial bias standard and requires deep-seated favoritism or antagonism to overturn presumption of impartiality)
State v. Hough, 990 N.E.2d 653 (2013) (opinion formed from proceedings does not equal disqualifying bias absent deep-seated antagonism)
In re Disqualification of Olivito, 74 Ohio St.3d 1261 (1994) (presumption that judges are unbiased)
Beer v. Griffith, 54 Ohio St.2d 440 (1978) (appellate courts lack authority to disqualify common pleas judges; chief justice has exclusive jurisdiction)
Jones v. Billingham, 105 Ohio App.3d 8 (1995) (procedural point on disqualification jurisdiction)
Williams v. Pennsylvania, 136 S. Ct. 1899 (2016) (due process outer bounds on judicial disqualification principles)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two-part ineffective-assistance standard)
State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136 (1989) (Ohio standard for deficient performance)
State v. White, 82 Ohio St.3d 16 (1998) (prejudice prong and reasonable-probability standard)
State v. Bonnell, 140 Ohio St.3d 209 (2014) (requires trial court to include consecutive-sentence findings in sentencing entry; remand for nunc pro tunc correction)