State v. Reeder, 365 P.3d 1243

Background

Reeder solicited approximately $1.7 million from McAllister across multiple payments for two separate real-estate deals; McAllister never recovered the funds. Reeder was charged with 14 counts of securities fraud and 14 counts of first-degree theft, each count tied to a separate payment/transaction.
The State obtained Reeder’s private bank records via subpoenas duces tecum issued in a special inquiry judge (SIJ) proceeding under RCW 10.27.170. Reeder moved to suppress, arguing article I, § 7 of the Washington Constitution required a warrant/probable cause. The trial court denied suppression; jury convicted on all counts and sentenced him.
On appeal the Court of Appeals affirmed; this Court granted review on two issues: (1) whether the SIJ subpoenas supplied “authority of law” under article I, § 7 to obtain bank records, and (2) whether multiple counts violated double jeopardy.
The majority held bank records are private affairs under article I, § 7 but an SIJ-issued subpoena (judicially reviewed and issued upon “reason to suspect crime or corruption”) provides sufficient authority of law without the probable-cause warrant standard.
On double jeopardy, the Court held the Legislature’s definitions (and charging practice) treat each separate sale/transaction as the unit of prosecution for securities fraud and each discrete act of obtaining control as a unit for theft; 14 separate transactions supported multiple counts and punishments.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Reeder)	Defendant's Argument (State)	Held
1. Did SIJ subpoenas to banks satisfy “authority of law” under Wash. Const. art. I, § 7 for obtaining private bank records?	SIJ subpoenas lack probable cause; bank records are sensitive private affairs and required warrant-like protection under article I, § 7 per Garcia-Salgado/Miles.	An SIJ subpoena is judicial process by a neutral magistrate, issued on “reason to suspect crime or corruption,” and is judicially reviewable, so it supplies sufficient authority of law without probable cause.	SIJ subpoenas issued by a neutral judge on reason to suspect are sufficient authority of law under article I, § 7; probable cause/warrant not required for judicially issued subpoenas.
2. Does obtaining bank records via SIJ subpoena violate privacy protections more protective than the Fourth Amendment?	Bank records deserve full article I, § 7 protection; third-party doctrine is rejected in Washington (Miles/Hinton) so subpoenas to third parties must meet probable cause.	Washington law allows judicial subpoenas as one lawful process to invade private affairs; SIJ proceedings are analogous to grand jury subpoenas and provide safeguards (neutral magistrate, secrecy, quash paths).	Court held SIJ subpoenas are analogizable to grand jury subpoenas and permissible on less than probable cause where issued by SIJ on reason to suspect.
3. Do multiple convictions (14 securities fraud; 14 theft) violate double jeopardy (multiple punishments for same offense)?	Reeder: the offenses flowed from a single continuing scheme/impulse and thus constitute one unit of prosecution; lenity favors fewer counts.	State: statutory definitions (sale includes each transaction; theft defined by each exertion of unauthorized control) support treating each discrete transaction as a separate unit of prosecution.	Each conviction corresponded to a distinct transaction; no double jeopardy violation.
4. Prosecution’s charging discretion and unit-of-prosecution ambiguity—should lenity apply?	Where statutory unit is ambiguous, rule of lenity requires construing in defendant’s favor.	Statutory language and precedent indicate the legislature intended each sale/transaction (securities) and each discrete obtaining of control (theft) to be punishable units; prosecution discretion is appropriate.	Court found statutory text and evidence supported distinct units for each count; lenity not triggered.

Key Cases Cited

State v. Miles, 160 Wn.2d 236 (Wash. 2007) (bank records are private affairs; administrative subpoenas insufficient — judicial review required)
State v. Garcia-Salgado, 170 Wn.2d 176 (Wash. 2010) (searches like DNA swabs require warrant-level protections absent an exception)
United States v. R. Enterprises, Inc., 498 U.S. 292 (U.S. 1991) (grand-jury subpoenas need not be supported by probable cause; subpoena may be justified by less than probable cause)
State v. Maxfield, 133 Wn.2d 332 (Wash. 1997) (article I, § 7 analysis divides private affairs and authority of law; subpoenas can constitute authority of law)
State v. Gunwall, 106 Wn.2d 54 (Wash. 1986) (authority of law under article I, § 7 can include constitutional statutes, common law, or court rules)
State v. Adel, 136 Wn.2d 629 (Wash. 1998) (unit-of-prosecution inquiry for double jeopardy: discern legislative intent)
United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (U.S. 1976) (Fourth Amendment third-party doctrine; federal rule that bank records carry limited Fourth Amendment privacy)