State v. Reed, 300 Kan. 494

Background

Defendant Willie E. Reed convicted by jury of two counts of aggravated indecent liberties with a child (two separate incidents involving 8‑year‑old girls in 2006 and 2008).
Facts: Reed allegedly rubbed his genital area against C.T.’s buttocks/back while she lay on a bed and later "humped" her; at a 2008 barbecue he reportedly put his hand on A.R.’s buttocks and pressed the front of his pants against her buttocks before she escaped. All parties were clothed.
Each victim wrote a handwritten note describing the incident; both gave recorded interviews to social‑workers that were played at trial. Both victims later testified at trial.
Reed testified and denied the conduct; prosecution relied on victims’ testimony, prior written statements, and recorded interviews.
Reed was sentenced under Jessica’s Law to concurrent life terms with a mandatory minimum of 40 years; he appealed raising sufficiency of evidence, evidentiary rulings (handwritten notes and recorded interviews), alleged Doyle violation (post‑arrest silence), cumulative error, and Eighth Amendment/cruel and unusual punishment challenge to the sentence.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Reed)	Held
Sufficiency of evidence that touches were "lewd" and made with sexual intent	Evidence (victim testimony, notes, recordings) shows genital contact/humping and circumstantial indicia of sexual intent; jury could convict	Touches occurred over clothing, no skin‑to‑skin, no touching of identified sex organs, no direct evidence of arousal	Affirmed: viewing evidence in light most favorable to State, a rational factfinder could find lewd touching and intent beyond reasonable doubt
Admissibility of victims’ handwritten notes	Notes are prior statements of witnesses present and cross‑examined; admissible under K.S.A. 60‑460(a); relevant to credibility	Notes were hearsay, cumulative, and prejudicial	Affirmed: Reed failed to brief hearsay objection and preserve specific trial grounds; notes admissible and relevant as prior consistent statements
Admission of recorded interviews and social‑worker testimony	Recordings admissible; victims testified and were available for cross‑examination	Recordings improperly bolstered credibility, cumulative and prejudicial; some specific portions objectionable	Not reviewed on the merits: Reed’s trial objection was limited and he failed to preserve the broader appellate grounds; issues waived
Alleged Doyle violation (use of post‑Miranda silence to impeach)	Prosecutor’s questions concerned Reed’s discussions with others and pre‑arrest silence; no impeachment based on post‑Miranda silence	Cross‑examination referenced that Reed had nearly two years to craft testimony and referred to period including post‑arrest; this impeached his silence after Miranda	Affirmed: record does not establish Miranda timing; questions targeted pre‑arrest or non‑governmental silence and were ambiguous; no Doyle violation shown
Cumulative error	N/A	Even if individual errors are minor, cumulative effect deprived Reed of fair trial	No error found on individual claims; cumulative‑error doctrine inapplicable
Cruel and/or unusual sentence under state and federal constitutions	N/A	Sentence (life with 40‑year parole ineligibility) disproportionate given facts and alleged mitigating factors	Affirmed: defendant failed to develop record or seek Rule 165 findings at sentencing; appellate court will not make factual findings; constitutional challenge waived/insufficiently preserved

Key Cases Cited

State v. Wells, 223 Kan. 94 (definition of "lewd" and standards for lewd touching)
State v. Ta, 296 Kan. 230 (definition and discussion of "lewd")
State v. Clark, 298 Kan. 843 (circumstantial proof of sexual intent; clothed touching can imply intent)
State v. Brown, 295 Kan. 181 (actual arousal not required; intent to arouse suffices)
Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (prohibition on impeaching defendant with post‑Miranda silence)
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda warnings and right to remain silent)
Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231 (pre‑arrest silence not protected by Doyle)