2019 Ohio 2259
Ohio Ct. App.2019Background
- Derek Reece was indicted on three fifth-degree felony forgery counts for presenting forged checks to purchase a vehicle; he never obtained the car.
- At arraignment (one week after initial appearance) Reece said he decided against hiring counsel and the court engaged in an extensive colloquy, allowed him to proceed pro se, and accepted a not-guilty plea.
- Ten weeks later, at a change-of-plea hearing Reece entered an Alford plea to one count in exchange for community-control recommendation; the court accepted the plea but made no explicit advisement or written waiver of the right to counsel at that hearing.
- Before sentencing Reece moved to withdraw his plea; the trial court denied the motion and imposed three years of community control with electronic monitoring.
- On appeal Reece argued the trial court erred by accepting the Alford plea without advising or securing a waiver of counsel (Crim.R. 11(C)(1) and Crim.R. 44), abused its discretion denying withdrawal of plea, and that the evidence was insufficient.
- The Sixth District vacated the conviction and remanded for trial, holding the record lacked evidence that Reece was readvised of his right to counsel or knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived it at the plea hearing; the other issues were rendered moot.
Issues
| Issue | Reece's Argument | State's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the trial court complied with Crim.R. 11(C)(1) and Crim.R. 44 before accepting an Alford plea | Court failed to advise or obtain a valid waiver of the right to counsel at the plea hearing | Arraignment colloquy ten weeks earlier satisfied the court’s obligations and constituted substantial compliance | Reversed: plea vacated. The court must readvise at plea and obtain a recorded (and for serious offenses written) waiver; arraignment waiver did not suffice after ten weeks |
| Whether Reece validly waived the right to counsel | He did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive counsel because no colloquy at plea and no written waiver | Implied waiver from earlier colloquy and statements that he was representing himself | Waiver not established; strong presumption against waiver requires contemporaneous colloquy showing awareness of dangers of self-representation |
| Whether the trial court abused discretion in denying motion to withdraw plea | Denial improper because plea was constitutionally infirm | Plea was valid and withdrawal was properly denied | Moot (not decided) because conviction vacated on counsel-waiver grounds |
| Whether evidence was sufficient to support conviction | Conviction unsupported by proof of essential elements | Evidence (forged checks, intent) supported the charge | Moot (not decided) due to reversal on waiver ground |
Key Cases Cited
- Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (right to counsel applies to states)
- Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (defendant has right to self-representation; must be aware of dangers)
- Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (right to counsel applies when imprisonment is a possible punishment)
- Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77 (plea hearing is a critical stage; no fixed script for waiver colloquy)
- Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708 (waiver must be knowing and intelligent; judge must inquire thoroughly)
- State v. Gibson, 45 Ohio St.2d 366 (Ohio: waiver of counsel must be knowing, intelligent, voluntary)
- State v. Wellman, 37 Ohio St.2d 162 (right to counsel attaches when imprisonment possible)
- State v. Obermiller, 147 Ohio St.3d 175 (trial court must ensure defendant is aware of dangers of self-representation)