482 P.3d 569
Idaho2020Background
- Jesse Rebo shared a Coeur d’Alene home with his wife; after pleading guilty to misdemeanor domestic assault, the court issued a no-contact order requiring him to stay 300 feet from his wife and the residence and instructing him to live elsewhere.
- Rebo acknowledged the order and had obtained a separate residence, but about a week later Officer Emily Taylor observed him near the former family home and confirmed the no-contact order remained in effect.
- Officer Taylor announced herself; Rebo retreated into the house, the officer followed, knocked, announced, entered the doorway, found Rebo and arrested him for violating the no-contact order.
- At booking, officers found methamphetamine on Rebo; he was charged with felony possession and other counts and moved to suppress the meth on Fourth Amendment grounds, arguing the officer’s warrantless entry into the home was unlawful.
- The district court ruled the entry lacked exigent circumstances but denied suppression because Rebo lacked Fourth Amendment standing: his subjective expectation of privacy was not objectively reasonable while he was prohibited by court order from being at the residence.
- The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed, holding Rebo lacked standing under both Katz/privacy and Jardines/property-based analyses because the no-contact order removed core rights (including the right to exclude law enforcement) relevant to Fourth Amendment protection.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Rebo had Fourth Amendment standing under the reasonable-expectation-of-privacy (Katz) test to challenge the warrantless entry | The State: Rebo lacked a reasonable, society-recognized expectation of privacy because a valid no-contact order prohibited his presence at the residence | Rebo: As a co-owner/occupant he retained a private expectation of privacy in the home despite the order | Held: No standing — Rebo’s subjective privacy interest was not objectively reasonable while the no-contact order barred him from the premises |
| Whether Rebo had standing under property/trespass principles (Jardines) to challenge the officer’s entry | The State: The no-contact order removed Rebo’s relevant property sticks (use/exclude) vis-à-vis law enforcement, so he could not assert a trespass-based violation | Rebo: Ownership/co-ownership gives a right to exclude and thus property-based standing to challenge an unlawful entry | Held: No standing — the order temporarily stripped him of the right to exclude officers enforcing the order, so trespass theory does not confer standing |
| Whether exigent circumstances justified the warrantless entry and/or whether the meth was fruit of the poisonous tree | The State: The officer reasonably enforced a court order and arrested Rebo for a present violation; exigency not necessary to preserve suppression ruling because standing absent | Rebo: No exigent circumstances existed; the entry was unlawful and the meth should be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree | Held: Court did not reach legality/exigent-circumstance exception on the merits because lack of standing rendered suppression inappropriate; denial of motion to suppress affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (established the reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test)
- Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978) (Fourth Amendment rights are personal; standing requires legitimate expectation of privacy)
- United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012) (property-based trespass theory supplements Katz analysis)
- Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1 (2013) (property/trespass principles support suppression when officers physically intrude on home curtilage)
- Byrd v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1518 (2018) (ownership typically supports an expectation of privacy but is not dispositive)
- Collins v. Virginia, 138 S. Ct. 1663 (2018) (warrantless entry into a home to effect an arrest generally unlawful absent exception)
- Soldal v. Cook Cnty., 506 U.S. 56 (1992) (property rights are not the sole measure of Fourth Amendment violations)
- State v. Maxim, 165 Idaho 901, 454 P.3d 543 (2019) (Idaho precedent describing deferential factual review and Fourth Amendment standing analysis)
- State v. Boyer, 133 A.3d 262 (N.H. 2016) (analogous holding that a bail/no-access order can eliminate the right-to-exclude stick and thus trespass-based standing)