337 Conn. 527
Conn.2021Background
- In June 2007 Raynor (defendant) rode in a car with Jose Rivera and shot and killed Delano Gray from a .223 Kel‑Tec assault rifle; Rivera drove and later implicated Raynor as the shooter.
- Police recovered a .223 Kel‑Tec rifle in July 2008; ballistics examiner James Stephenson testified that casings from the Enfield Street murder and a separate February 2008 Baltimore Street shooting were positively matched to that rifle.
- Raynor was convicted of murder after a 2015 retrial; the Appellate Court affirmed. The U.S. Supreme Court’s Daubert principles are applied in Connecticut via State v. Porter.
- Raynor moved pretrial for (1) a Porter (Daubert) hearing challenging ballistics reliability based on National Academy of Sciences (NAS) reports, (2) a limiting order to restrict the expert to a "more likely than not" formulation, and (3) exclusion of evidence about the Baltimore Street shooting as unduly prejudicial. The trial court denied all three motions.
- The Connecticut Supreme Court held: the trial court abused its discretion by denying a Porter hearing without considering the NAS criticisms (and that error was not harmless); the court did not abuse its discretion in refusing the specific "more likely than not" limitation; but the court erred in admitting the Baltimore Street uncharged‑misconduct evidence because its prejudicial effect outweighed probative value. The judgment was reversed and remanded for a new trial.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Raynor) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a Porter (Daubert) hearing on firearm/toolmark methodology was required | Legnani controls; firearm/toolmark identification remains well established and thus no Porter hearing needed | NAS reports raise substantial doubts about methodology, error rates, and individualization; Porter hearing required to test reliability | Trial court abused discretion by denying a Porter hearing without considering NAS evidence; error not harmless; new trial ordered |
| Whether the court should limit the expert to saying matches are only "more likely than not" | Such a proscribed formula is arbitrary; experts may state opinions in accepted terms (e.g., reasonable degree/practical certainty) | Methodology is insufficiently validated and experts should be restricted to "more likely than not" wording | Denial of the narrow "more likely than not" restriction was not an abuse of discretion given scant support for that precise language; trial courts retain discretion to impose appropriate limits later |
| Whether admission of testimony/evidence about the Baltimore Street shooting (uncharged misconduct) was admissible | Admissible to prove identity and means; probative because same weapon linked both incidents; limiting instructions mitigate prejudice | Highly prejudicial with limited probative value (different victims, distinct incident, temporal gap); would unduly arouse jury against defendant | Admission was improper: prejudicial effect outweighed probative value (similarities insufficient and linkage weak); evidence should have been excluded; supports new trial |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Porter, 241 Conn. 57 (Conn. 1997) (adopts Daubert‑style gatekeeping for scientific expert evidence in Connecticut)
- Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579 (U.S. 1993) (federal framework for assessing reliability of scientific expert testimony)
- State v. Legnani, 109 Conn. App. 399 (Conn. App. 2008) (Appellate Court decision treating firearm/toolmark identification as sufficiently established to forego Porter hearing)
- State v. Collins, 299 Conn. 567 (Conn. 2011) (articulates two‑part test for admissibility of other‑acts/uncharged misconduct and prejudice/probative balancing)
- State v. Edwards, 325 Conn. 97 (Conn. 2017) (discusses Porter factors and harmless‑error standard for nonconstitutional evidentiary rulings)