State v. Raymond Clements, 83 A.3d 553

Background

On June 14, 2007 two women, Heather Jesus and Amanda Sousa, were murdered and their bodies set on fire in Providence; both deaths were ruled homicides. Raymond Clements and Anthony Carter were charged; Carter later testified for the state after pleading guilty.
Carter testified that Sousa had threatened to report Clements and Carter for filing a false stolen-car report unless they paid her; Clements and Carter agreed to kill Sousa (and Jesus to remove a witness).
Carter described the killings in detail, including that he strangled Jesus, Clements and Sousa struggled (Clements used a railroad spike), both victims had their throats cut, and the bodies were doused with accelerant (WD-40) and burned.
Physical and forensic evidence and multiple corroborating witnesses (Jessica Carter, Carter’s grandmother, medical examiner) supported Carter’s account.
At trial the prosecution elicited testimony that Clements and Carter committed a robbery on June 13 (the day before the murders). Clements objected; the trial justice admitted the testimony under Rule 404(b) as inextricably woven into the story and instructed the jury on limited use of that evidence.
Clements was convicted of two counts of murder, conspiracy, and arson; he appealed arguing improper admission of the June 13 robbery evidence, inadequate limiting instructions, and that the trial justice erred in denying a motion to pass after a prosecutor’s closing remark about the robbery.

Issues

Issue	State's Argument	Clements' Argument	Held
Admissibility of June 13 robbery under Rule 404(b)	Robbery evidence was necessary to avoid a factual vacuum and to show relationship/conspiracy with Carter	Evidence was propensity evidence with little nonpropensity purpose and should be excluded under Rule 404(b) and Pona precedents	Admission was problematic but harmless beyond a reasonable doubt given overwhelming independent evidence of guilt
Exclusion under Rule 403 (unfair prejudice)	Evidence not so inflammatory relative to gruesome murders; probative value acceptable	Robbery was marginally relevant and prejudicial, should have been excluded	Rule 403 did not bar the evidence; it was not enormously prejudicial in context
Adequacy of limiting instructions on use of 404(b) evidence	Instructions limited use to witness credibility and forbade propensity inference	Instructions were deficient for not explaining permissible uses beyond exclusion for propensity	Defendant failed to preserve contention (no contemporaneous objection); instructions were given multiple times and issue is waived on appeal
Motion to pass after prosecutor’s closing misstatement (that defendant admitted robbery to police)	Prosecutor’s remark was a reasonable inference about credibility and within latitude of argument; trial instructions mitigated harm	Misstatement was extraneous and prejudicial; warranted passing the case	Trial justice did not abuse discretion in denying motion to pass; remark was not inflammatory and jury instructed that arguments are not evidence

Key Cases Cited

State v. Pona, 948 A.2d 941 (R.I. 2008) (Pona I) (limits on prior-act evidence that tends only to show propensity)
State v. Pona, 66 A.3d 454 (R.I. 2013) (Pona II) (reiteration of 404(b)/403 balancing and permissible prior-act evidence)
State v. Gaspar, 982 A.2d 140 (R.I. 2009) (Rule 404(b) and cautionary-instruction principles)
State v. Rodriguez, 996 A.2d 145 (R.I. 2010) (Rule 404(b) purposes are illustrative, not exhaustive)
State v. Gomes, 690 A.2d 310 (R.I. 1997) (other-crimes evidence admissible when needed to present coherent story)
State v. Bailey, 677 A.2d 407 (R.I. 1996) (harmless-error analysis for evidentiary rulings)
State v. Boillard, 789 A.2d 881 (R.I. 2002) (latitude in prosecutor’s closing; evaluate remarks in context)