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State v. Ray
429 Md. 566
| Md. | 2012
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Background

  • Ray, incompetent to stand trial, was initially charged in 2001 and committed for restoration efforts at Clifton T. Perkins.
  • In 2009, CP § 3-107 required dismissal of charges after certain time without restoration, and the charges were dismissed without prejudice.
  • The State re-indicted Ray, who again was found incompetent and dangerous and placed in 1ST commitment; Ray challenged the re-indictment.
  • Ray I held insufficient grounds to extend the charges; the State could re-institute charges, and civil commitment could proceed separately.
  • HB 795 (2006) amended the incompetency statutes to include periodic reviews and restore safeguards against indefinite commitments, while preserving the ability to re-indict after a § 3-107 dismissal.
  • The Court ultimately held that re-indictment after a § 3-107 dismissal is permissible, but 1ST commitment cannot proceed while there is a presumption of unrestorability; remand for restorability determination is required.

Issues

Issue Plaintiff's Argument Defendant's Argument Held
May the State re-indict after a § 3-107 dismissal without proof of restorability? Ray: re-indictment after dismissal conflicts with Jackson and rests on unrestorability. Ray: re-indictment is permissible only if restorable; otherwise improper. Re-indictment is permissible without restorability proof.
Does the § 3-107 dismissal effect bar on subsequent commitment without restorability findings? Ray: must show restorability before any commitment following dismissal. State may rely on later restorability findings; dismissal does not bar re-indictment. Dismissal creates a presumption of unrestorability but does not bar later restorability evidence; remand for restorability determination.
What is the correct interpretation of § 3-107's dismissal without prejudice in the context of re-indictment and commitment? Ray: without prejudice means the State cannot re-indict to avoid indefinite commitments. State may re-indict; dismissal without prejudice signals flexibility, not a limit on re-indictment. Dismissal without prejudice does not bar re-indictment; the key is restorability for commitment.
What does Jackson v. Indiana require for future confinement when a defendant is unrestorable? Ray: cannot hold beyond reasonable time unless restorability is shown. Jackson informs due process; focus on restorability, not re-indictment timing. Jackson requires consideration of restorability; timing addressed via statutory framework, including 3-107.

Key Cases Cited

  • Ray v. State, 410 Md. 384 (Md. 2009) (reaffirmed that re-indictment may occur after § 3-107 dismissal)
  • Ray v. State, Ray II, 204 Md.App. 418 (Md. App. 2012) (intermediate court held re-indictment requires restoratability showing)
  • Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (U.S. 1972) (indefinite commitment violates due process and equal protection; focus on restorability/time)
Read the full case

Case Details

Case Name: State v. Ray
Court Name: Court of Appeals of Maryland
Date Published: Dec 18, 2012
Citation: 429 Md. 566
Docket Number: No. 23
Court Abbreviation: Md.