State v. Ray
397 P.3d 817
Utah Ct. App.2017Background
- Eric Matthew Ray (28) had a sexual relationship via texts and a Utah hotel visit with a 15‑year‑old girl (Victim); no vaginal intercourse was testified to at trial.
- Victim testified to extensive kissing, touching of breasts and genital area over and under clothing, oral contact, and that Ray touched the outside of her vagina.
- Police investigation included a hospital interview of Victim and undercover text conversations in which Ray confirmed many non‑criminal details but denied criminal acts. Ray was arrested when he returned to Utah.
- Ray was tried on two counts of forcible sodomy, one count of object rape (acquitted), and one count of forcible sexual abuse (convicted). The jury deadlocked on the sodomy counts.
- Trial counsel did not request a jury instruction defining the statutory catch‑all phrase "indecent liberties" in the forcible sexual abuse statute.
- On appeal the Utah Court of Appeals held counsel was ineffective for failing to seek a definition or excision of "indecent liberties," reversed the conviction, and remanded for a new trial.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a jury definition of "indecent liberties" in the forcible sexual abuse instruction | Ray: counsel was ineffective because the phrase is vague and has been judicially narrowed; omission deprived jury of an essential element | State: no reversible error because jury received elements instruction; omission was not prejudicial | Court: Counsel's performance was objectively deficient and prejudicial; reversal and new trial required |
| Whether omission to define "indecent liberties" constituted failure to instruct on an essential element | Ray: definition is an element (must be the same magnitude as enumerated acts) | State: jury could rely on common‑sense meaning; state relied on enumerated acts anyway | Court: "indecent liberties" is unconstitutionally vague without judicial narrowing; definition is an element and counsel should have sought instruction or excision |
| Whether there was prejudice from counsel's omission given jury verdict pattern | Ray: mixed verdicts and credibility issues suggest jury may have convicted on moral disapproval under vague phrase | State: verdict indicates jury believed some testimony; no assurance the omission affected outcome | Court: Mixed verdicts + credibility problems create reasonable likelihood of different result absent error; prejudice shown |
| Whether Victim's inconsistent testimony made it "inherently improbable" such that conviction should be vacated without retrial | Ray: Victim's contradictions render testimony inherently improbable under Robbins | State: inconsistencies raise credibility issues for jury, not the rare category of inherent improbability | Court: Rejected inherent improbability; doctrine is narrow and reserved for patently impossible or demonstrably false testimony; credibility issues are for jury |
Key Cases Cited
- Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926) (statute unconstitutionally vague if people must guess at meaning)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two‑part ineffective assistance test: deficient performance and prejudice)
- Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367 (1988) (jury verdicts must not rest on improper grounds; appellate courts must remand when substantial possibility of improper basis exists)