State v. Rangel, 25 A.3d 1183

Defendant Rang el attacked 18-year-old P.F. in the early morning of April 22, 2007, after chasing her as she walked home and she called 9-1-1 during the pursuit.
P.F. sustained blows to the head and face, fell, and after fighting back, defendant allegedly raped her and sexually touched her with his fingers as she lay on the ground.
Police arrived, defendant fled, and P.F. was transported to the hospital with visible injuries; medical photographs documented swelling to her lips and nose.
Rangel was indicted on multiple counts including first-degree aggravated sexual assault under N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a)(3), second-degree attempted aggravated sexual assault, and other related offenses; count four was dismissed prior to trial.
The jury convicted on counts three, five, and six; the trial judge sentenced him to 20 years NERA on count one, 7 years on count five, and a concurrent 365 days on count six, with 5 years of parole supervision; counts were merged as appropriate.
On appeal, the court vacated counts one and two, holding the phrase 'on another' in N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a)(3) refers to a third party victim, not the sexual assault victim, and remanded for resentencing on remaining counts.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Meaning of 'on another' in 2C:14-2(a)(3)	Rangel argues 'on another' targets the victim of the sexual assault.	Rangel contends it refers to a third party aggressor.	Counts 1–2 vacated; 'on another' construed to require a third-party aggravated assault.
Prosecutor's summation overreach	State asserts fair framing of the victim and the charged conduct.	Defendant argues overemphasis and improper framing violated due process.	Appeal rejected on merits; issue deemed without merit requiring discussion.
Right to remain silent instruction	No preserved error raised on jury instruction regarding silence.	Instruction may have undercut presumption of innocence by comment on silence.	No reversible error found; instruction upheld as proper comment on silence.
Aggregate sentence manifest excessiveness	Challenge to the 27-year base custodial sentence and related terms.	Argues sentences were excessive, especially consecutive term on count five.	Court vacated counts 1 and 2; remanded for resentencing on remaining counts; no determination of excess as to the remaining counts.
Merging of counts	Contends counts should be merged to reflect single offense.	Argues misapplication of merger principles failed to merge count five into count one.	Concluded misapplication of merger in counts, leading to reversal of counts 1 and 2 and remand for re-sentencing on remaining counts.

State v. Drury, 190 N.J. 197 (2007) (defines trigger offenses for 2C:14-2(a)(3))
State v. Jones, 308 N.J. Super. 174 (App.Div. 1998) (explains absence of consent under 2C:14-2(a)(3))
State v. Handy, 206 N.J. 39 (2011) (plenary review of legal conclusions; deference not given to trial court’s conclusions)
State v. M.T.S., 129 N.J. 422 (1992) (discusses 'physical force' and coercion in context of consent)
State v. Shelley, 205 N.J. 320 (2011) (guides statutory interpretation of ambiguous penal provisions)
State v. Reiner, 180 N.J. 307 (2004) (statutory interpretation principles in criminal law)
State v. Gelman, 195 N.J. 475 (2008) (lenity doctrine in criminal statute interpretation)
State v. Anastasia, 356 N.J. Super. 534 (App.Div. 2003) (reversal when essential elements of charged crime not proven)