802 N.W.2d 194
Wis. Ct. App.2011Background
- Randall was charged in 1976 with multiple counts including first-degree murder, burglary, and unauthorized vehicle operation for crimes in 1974–75, during which two police officers were killed.
- He pled not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity; trial was bifurcated, with the guilt phase yielding several convictions and acquittals on other counts.
- Based on a NGI plea, the parties stipulated that Randall was not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect for certain counts, and he was committed to Central State Hospital with time-served/judicial disposition as part of his sentence.
- Randall repeatedly petitioned for re-examination and conditional release, with petitions in 1990, 1991, 1995, and 2008; prior petitions were denied or resulted in recommittment.
- This petition (2008) sought conditional release under Wis. Stat. § 971.17(2); the trial court denied, holding Randall remained a danger to himself or others based on crime brutality, institutional behavior, and expert testimony.
- On appeal, the court applied a sufficiency-of-the-evidence standard and affirmed, concluding credible evidence supported continued dangerousness and that the court could balance statutory factors in § 971.17(4)(d).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Standard of review for dangerousness | Randall argues for clear-error review of factual findings and independent review of legal conclusions. | State argues for sufficiency-of-evidence review under Randall II/Wilinski. | Standard is sufficiency of the evidence. |
| Evidence supporting dangerousness | Randall contends the experts' opinions show no current danger and thus release is appropriate. | State asserts credible evidence supports continued dangerousness, including brutal crimes and behavior patterns. | The record contains credible evidence supporting dangerousness. |
| Role of expert testimony | Experts say Randall is not currently mentally ill and could be released under conditions. | Trial court may reject or weigh differently the experts' opinions. | Trial court properly weighed evidence, not bound to accept experts' conclusions. |
| Application of § 971.17(4)(d) factors | Court should apply statutory factors to determine danger and liberty interests. | Not all factors must be applied; discretion to consider relevant ones. | Court validly considered factors and balanced interests; not all factors are mandatory. |
| Mental illness attribution and original offenses | Original offenses not explained by mental illness; misdiagnosis undermines current lack of danger. | Experts found Randall not mentally ill; history should not preclude release if otherwise safe. | Credible evidence supported finding that Randall was not mentally ill at time of crimes and remained dangerous due to conduct and behavior. |
Key Cases Cited
- Randall v. State, 192 Wis.2d 800 (1995) (upholds constitutionality of Wis. Stat. § 971.17(2) and guidance on dangerousness balancing)
- State v. Randall, 222 Wis.2d 53 (Ct. App. 1998) (reaffirmed sufficiency of evidence standard for dangerousness)
- State v. Wilinski, 314 Wis.2d 643 (2008) (articulated sufficiency-of-evidence standard for original commitment and deference to trial court's credibility findings)
- State v. Jefferson, 163 Wis.2d 332 (Ct. App. 1991) (discussed review standard for dangerousness before Randall II)
- State v. Brown, 279 Wis.2d 102 (2005) (articulated deference to trial court on credibility and reasonable inferences)
- Bautista v. State, 53 Wis.2d 218 (1971) (early articulation of standard for reasonable inferences upon evidence)
- Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354 (1983) (finding that prior criminal acts support dangerousness findings)