State v. Ramseur, 374 N.C. 658

Background

In 2007 Ramseur was indicted for two first-degree murders and the State sought the death penalty; he was convicted and sentenced to death in 2010.
The North Carolina Racial Justice Act (RJA) (2009) allowed capital defendants to seek relief—including vacatur of a death sentence and resentencing to life without parole—based on statistical or other evidence that race was a significant factor; the RJA was enacted with retroactive effect.
Ramseur filed RJA post-conviction motions; before the trial court ruled, the General Assembly amended the RJA (2012) tightening evidentiary rules and adding a waiver and then repealed the RJA entirely (2013), making the repeal retroactive and declaring pending RJA motions void.
The trial court dismissed Ramseur’s RJA claims (and denied discovery/hearing); Ramseur sought certiorari to the North Carolina Supreme Court.
The North Carolina Supreme Court held the retroactive repeal (and certain evidentiary changes in the 2012 amendment) violate the Ex Post Facto Clauses and reversed, ruling the trial court erred in denying an evidentiary hearing and discovery; it remanded for further proceedings.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Ramseur)	Held
Whether retroactive repeal of the RJA violates the Ex Post Facto Clauses	Repeal does not increase punishment; RJA was procedural/optional and the repeal merely returns law to pre-RJA status applicable at offense time	Retroactive repeal removes an ameliorative, substantive remedy (possible life-without-parole) that had been made available retroactively, thereby increasing punishment and violating Ex Post Facto	Repeal applied retroactively to pending RJA claims is an unconstitutional ex post facto law and cannot void those pending motions; reversal ordered
Whether the 2012 Amended RJA may be applied retroactively	Amended RJA valid retroactive correction/clarification; amendments procedural or within legislature’s power	Amended evidentiary restrictions and waiver strip substantive defenses and thus are ex post facto if applied retroactively	Evidentiary changes (narrowed geographic/time scope; statistical evidence limitations) are substantive/ex post facto and cannot apply retroactively; the grant of judicial discretion to hold hearings is procedural and may be applied retroactively; waiver issue reserved
Whether the trial court could deny Ramseur’s RJA and Amended RJA claims on the pleadings without an evidentiary hearing	The motions failed to state sufficient claims; dismissal on pleadings appropriate	Motions and forecasted evidence sufficiently plead RJA claims and required an evidentiary hearing and discovery	Trial court erred: Ramseur’s forecasts state sufficient claims under the Original RJA; an evidentiary hearing and discovery were required; denial on pleadings reversed
Whether Ramseur was entitled to discovery relating to his RJA claims	No additional discovery necessary; claims could be dismissed	Defendant entitled to discovery under governing statutes for capital post-conviction proceedings to develop statistical and nonstatistical proof	Court held defendant was entitled to discovery; trial court abused discretion by denying it

Key Cases Cited

Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386 (1798) (original statement of Calder categories of ex post facto laws)
Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167 (1925) (definition of ex post facto as laws increasing punishment or depriving defenses)
Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37 (1990) (Calder categories reaffirmed; scope of ex post facto analysis)
Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282 (1977) (distinguishing procedural changes from substantive increases in punishment)
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987) (limits of using statewide statistical proof in constitutional claims; legislative role in remedying systemic disparities)
California Dep’t of Corr. v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499 (1995) (ex post facto inquiry focuses on whether change increases the measure of punishment)
Peugh v. United States, 569 U.S. 530 (2013) (ex post facto application beyond merely increasing maximum sentence)
Carmell v. Texas, 529 U.S. 513 (2000) (fundamental fairness concern in retroactively changing evidentiary rules)
State v. Keith, 63 N.C. 140 (1869) (North Carolina precedent on retroactive repeal of an earlier ameliorative legislative act)
State v. Robinson, 368 N.C. 596 (2015) (trial-court RJA rulings vacated; contextual backdrop to legislative response)