State v. Ramos
2013 NMSC 031
| N.M. | 2013Background
- Andrea Reed obtained an ex parte temporary order of protection against Aaron Ramos prohibiting him from coming within 25 yards of her in public; Ramos was personally served.
- Ramos went to a bar where Reed was present (~12–15 yards away); after being told Reed was there he stayed briefly, then left; he was arrested and charged with violating the protective order.
- At trial Ramos requested a jury instruction that the State must prove he "knowingly" violated the order; the district court denied that request and instead gave a general criminal-intent instruction (UJI 14-141).
- The jury convicted Ramos of the misdemeanor and he was sentenced to jail and probation; the Court of Appeals affirmed.
- The New Mexico Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether a knowing mens rea is required to convict for violating a protection order and whether denying Ramos’s requested instruction was reversible error.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Section 40-13-6 requires proof that a defendant "knowingly" violated a protective order | State: statute is silent on mens rea; no specific "knowing" term means general intent or strict liability can suffice | Ramos: statute should be read to require that the defendant knowingly violated the order (knew of order and knew protected person was within protected zone) | Court held statute requires a knowing violation (knowledge of the order and knowledge of the protected party’s presence within the restricted zone) |
| Whether violation can be treated as strict liability or satisfied by general intent instruction | State: argue strict liability or general intent instruction adequate | Ramos: general intent does not ensure awareness of victim’s presence; risk of convicting innocently present persons | Court rejected strict liability and held general intent instruction alone was insufficient in this context |
| Whether defendant’s failure to read the order negates knowledge of its terms | State: service provides constructive/imputed knowledge despite failure to read | Ramos: claimed he didn’t know the 25-yard term because he didn’t read it | Court held personal service imputes knowledge of the order’s contents; deliberate ignorance is not a defense |
| Whether denial of the "knowing" instruction was reversible error | State: evidence otherwise supported conviction under given instructions | Ramos: requested correct instruction; its denial was fundamental error | Court held denial was reversible error and remanded for new trial with correct instruction |
Key Cases Cited
- Santillanes v. State, 115 N.M. 215, 849 P.2d 358 (N.M. 1993) (presumption that criminal intent is required unless Legislature clearly omits mens rea)
- State v. Gonzalez, 137 N.M. 107, 107 P.3d 547 (N.M. Ct. App. 2005) (silence as to mens rea does not create strict liability; knowledge required for bringing contraband into jail)
- State v. Nozie, 146 N.M. 142, 207 P.3d 1119 (N.M. 2009) (knowledge of victim's identity is an essential element where statute’s deterrent purpose requires it)
- State v. Hargrove, 108 N.M. 233, 771 P.2d 166 (N.M. 1989) (knowledge and intent are separate elements; general intent instruction may be insufficient)
- Stevenson v. Louis Dreyfus Corp., 112 N.M. 97, 811 P.2d 1308 (N.M. 1991) (deliberate ignorance can be charged as knowledge)