State v. Ramirez
S-1-SC-35566
| N.M. | Jan 4, 2018Background
- Luis Ramirez (Defendant) was tried as an accessory for crimes committed by his brother Alejandro: convicted of willful and deliberate first‑degree murder (as an accessory), conspiracy to commit first‑degree murder, three counts of child abuse by endangerment, one count of aggravated assault, and one count of shooting at or from a motor vehicle resulting in injury. Jury acquitted him of tampering with evidence.
- Factual core: Alejandro approached a parked family SUV, talked with the victim while leaning on the passenger window; Defendant arrived in a white Blazer, blocked the SUV, spoke with Alejandro, handed him an object, Alejandro returned and shot the victim multiple times, then reentered the Blazer and they fled; three children and the victim’s wife were present and terrified.
- Defendant argued on appeal: (1) insufficient evidence for most convictions (accessory intent, conspiracy, child abuse, aggravated assault); (2) double jeopardy violations; (3) erroneous jury instructions (accessory "mere presence" instruction refused; conspiracy jury instruction omitted intent element); and (4) sentencing errors including serious‑violent‑offense designations and degree of the shooting offense.
- The district court sentenced Defendant to life plus additional years and labeled the child abuse and aggravated assault counts as serious violent offenses without making specific on‑the‑record findings.
- The Supreme Court of New Mexico affirmed all convictions except vacated the shooting‑into‑motor‑vehicle conviction on double jeopardy grounds and remanded for re‑sentencing on child abuse and aggravated assault to permit required findings about serious violent offense designations.
Issues
| Issue | State's Argument | Ramirez's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency of evidence for murder as accessory (deliberate intent) | Evidence (Defendant as driver, blocking SUV, handing object, waiting and driving getaway) supports inference Defendant shared Alejandro’s deliberate intent | Only Alejandro had deliberate intent; evidence speculative as to Defendant’s intent | Affirmed: circumstantial evidence (driver/getaway/hand‑off/flight) sufficed to infer accessory deliberate intent |
| Sufficiency for conspiracy to commit murder | Sequence (stalling by Alejandro, Defendant’s arrival, close conference, careful handoff) supports inference of an agreement to kill | Inference of agreement is speculative, lacks direct proof | Affirmed: agreement may be inferred from words/acts and conduct showed concerted plan |
| Sufficiency for child abuse by endangerment | Children were visible in SUV; Defendant was close and handed object; jury could find he knew or should have known they were in danger | Windows were tinted; two children were teenagers; State didn’t prove Defendant knew children were present or intended harm | Affirmed: evidence permitted inference Defendant saw children and recklessly disregarded their safety |
| Double jeopardy: shooting into vehicle vs. homicide | State conceded or Court held unitary act cannot support both punishments | Challenged multiple punishments | Vacated shooting‑into‑motor‑vehicle conviction under Montoya (unitary act); shorter sentence conviction vacated |
| Double jeopardy: multiple child abuse counts | Each child suffered fear and shock from the same shooting event | Argued unitary conduct should bar multiple counts | Affirmed: multiple convictions for separate child victims do not violate double jeopardy |
| Double jeopardy: conspiracy vs. accessory murder | Conspiracy and accessory are distinct offenses; State relied on agreement and separate acts | Argued both convictions arise from identical conduct and should not be separately punished | Affirmed: conspiracy and aiding/abetting are separate, Legislature intended multiple punishments; Silvas distinguished by single‑moment proof |
| Jury instruction — refusal to give UJI 14‑2823 (mere presence) | Court followed use note prohibiting that instruction; other instructions covered accessory theory | Failure to give "mere presence" instruction prejudiced Defendant | No error: court properly refused the instruction per controlling precedent |
| Jury instruction — conspiracy instruction omitted intent element | Omitted explicit intent element in the written instruction | Omitted element was fundamental; conviction unreliable | Not fundamental error: jury’s finding of agreement and surrounding facts made the intent element evident |
| Sentencing — designation as serious violent offenses | State relied on district court’s labeling | Defendant argued court failed to make required specific findings showing nature of offense and resulting harm | Remanded for re‑sentencing on child abuse and aggravated assault so court can make required findings; other sentencing challenge about shooting degree rendered moot by vacatur |
Key Cases Cited
(No key authorities with official reporter citations appear in the opinion text provided.)