State v. R.K., 106 A.3d 1224

Background

Victim C.G., age nine, accused her mother’s boyfriend, R.K., of repeated sexual abuse (touching, masturbation, and cunnilingus); no physical evidence existed and the case turned on credibility.
Mother (K.G.) and stepsister (K.K.) reported C.G.’s statements to police; C.G. later testified and identified the allegations.
At trial the State admitted K.G. and K.K. to give fresh-complaint testimony; K.G. gave graphic detail and a physical demonstration; K.K. expressed belief in C.G.’s truthfulness.
Defense sought to elicit testimony that K.G. suspected R.K. had cheated and intended to leave him (proffered to show bias); the trial court excluded it as hearsay.
Jury acquitted on one sexual-assault count, hung on another, and convicted R.K. of endangering the welfare of a child and child abuse; Appellate Division affirmed.
The Supreme Court reversed, holding: excessive fresh-complaint detail, impermissible bolstering, and erroneous exclusion of bias evidence deprived R.K. of a fair trial and warranted a new trial.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (R.K.)	Held
Admissibility and scope of fresh-complaint testimony; failure to give limiting instruction	Fresh-complaint testimony was narrow and necessary to explain complaint; no plain error from omission	Testimony was overly detailed and cumulative; lack of limiting instruction allowed jurors to treat it as substantive evidence	Court: Fresh-complaint testimony was excessive and prejudicial; omission of required limiting instruction raised plain error; reversal and new trial ordered
Witness bolstering (K.K. and K.G. expressing belief in C.G.)	Such testimony was responsive and reasonable to counter defense themes	Statements improperly vouched for victim and affected credibility contest	Court: Bolstering testimony was improper and prejudicial in a credibility-driven case; reversible error
Exclusion of defense proffer to show witness bias (K.G.’s intent to leave R.K.)	Information was remote and tenuous; admissible only if properly framed	Proffered statements were admissible to show K.G.’s bias/interest and thus impeachment	Court: Excluding bias evidence was error; proffered testimony was admissible to show interest and could have affected credibility
Other prosecutorial / evidentiary challenges (prior convictions, arrest circumstances, summation)	Prosecutor’s conduct and references were proper and within bounds	Cross-exam questions and summation comments were prejudicial; warrant testimony suggested dangerousness	Court: Did not reach these issues on merits given reversal on primary errors; noted concerns but left them undecided

Key Cases Cited

State v. Hill, 121 N.J. 150 (N.J. 1990) (explains fresh-complaint doctrine and purpose to rebut fabrication inferences)
State v. Balles, 47 N.J. 331 (N.J. 1966) (fresh-complaint may include minimal details necessary to identify nature of complaint)
State v. Bethune, 121 N.J. 137 (N.J. 1990) (limits fresh-complaint detail; requires limiting instruction; discusses tender-years hearsay exception)
State v. W.B., 205 N.J. 588 (N.J. 2011) (fresh-complaint standards for spontaneity, timing, and recipient; relaxations for juvenile victims)
State v. Tirone, 64 N.J. 222 (N.J. 1974) (fresh-complaint foundational requirements)
State v. P.H., 178 N.J. 378 (N.J. 2004) (reaffirms requirement for limiting instruction on fresh-complaint evidence)
State v. Frisby, 174 N.J. 583 (N.J. 2002) (prohibits witness testimony that improperly bolsters another witness’s credibility)
State v. Clausell, 121 N.J. 298 (N.J. 1990) (limits on witnesses’ credibility assessments and impermissible bolstering)