State v. R. Collins, 528 P.3d 1106

Collins was originally charged with multiple child sexual offenses; two counts were amended to felony Criminal Endangerment under a plea agreement dated June 7, 2021.
The plea agreement (non‑binding) provided Collins would plead guilty/no contest to the amended counts, the State would recommend concurrent six‑year suspended sentences, and Collins would register as a sex offender during the sentence.
At the plea colloquy Collins explicitly acknowledged the plea was non‑binding and that the court could impose a harsher sentence he could not withdraw from.
At sentencing victims read impact statements; the State said it had entered the plea in good faith and asked the court to follow it but also noted the victims’ statements and urged the court to consider an appropriate fine.
The District Court rejected the recommended suspended sentences as “wholly inadequate,” imposed two concurrent 10‑year prison terms (maximum), and ordered Tier I sex‑offender registration.
Collins moved post‑judgment alleging the State breached the plea bargain at sentencing and argued the court lacked authority under §46‑23‑512, MCA, to impose SVORA registration after rejecting the plea recommendation; the District Court denied the breach claim. Collins appealed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Collins)	Held
Did the State breach the plea agreement at sentencing?	The State fulfilled the agreement in good faith, expressly asked the court to follow the plea, and any references to victims were statutorily authorized and not intended to undermine the plea.	The State paid only “lip service” to the agreed recommendation, failed to advocate for it, and emphasized victim dissatisfaction and trauma to prompt the court to reject the recommendation.	No — the Court held the State did not breach; its conduct was within permissible bounds and it acted in good faith.
Could the court lawfully impose sex‑offender registration under §46‑23‑512 after deviating from the plea recommendation?	The court retained authority to impose registration because Collins agreed to registration in the plea and the court’s deviation did not negate the agreement.	When the court rejected the agreed sentence recommendation it effectively rejected the plea terms for purposes of §46‑23‑512, so it lacked statutory authority to impose registration.	Yes in part/no in part — the Court concluded the court lacked authority under §46‑23‑512 after deviating and therefore unlawfully imposed SVORA registration; remanded to strike registration.

Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971) (prosecutor must fulfill plea promises; strict performance required to protect voluntariness of plea)
Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129 (2009) (government breach entitles injured party to remedy but does not retroactively void a knowing voluntary plea)
State v. Rardon, 313 Mont. 321, 61 P.3d 132 (2002) (prosecutor must present case in good faith and not undermine plea recommendation; lip service doctrine)
State v. Brown, 193 Mont. 15, 629 P.2d 777 (1981) (where court is aware of plea terms, prosecutor need not recite or fully explain the recommendation at sentencing)
State v. Grana, 351 Mont. 499, 213 P.3d 783 (2009) (SVORA may be imposed where defendant consented in plea and obtained the full benefit of the bargain)
State v. Bowley, 282 Mont. 298, 938 P.2d 592 (1997) (prosecutor breaches plea by effectively endorsing a different sentence than the agreed recommendation)
State v. LaMere, 272 Mont. 355, 900 P.2d 926 (1995) (example where prosecutor’s failure to explain and subsequent emphasis on negative traits undermined plea recommendation)