State v. R. Butterfly, 377 P.3d 1191

Background

In Oct 2013 Butterfly failed to return to a pre‑release center and was charged with escape in Powell County; he was arrested and later transferred to Montana State Prison (MSP).
Butterfly objected to venue; the State stipulated venue was Yellowstone County and Powell County dismissed the charge without prejudice on Feb 11, 2014.
The State re‑filed the same escape charge in Yellowstone County on Sept 8, 2014; trial was set for Feb 9, 2015.
Butterfly moved to dismiss for violation of his speedy trial right, arguing the time from the original Powell filing (and the seven‑month lapse before re‑filing) should be counted; he alleged prejudice from delay.
The District Court ruled the speedy‑trial clock began only at the Yellowstone filing (155 days before trial) and denied dismissal; Butterfly reserved the speedy‑trial issue on guilty plea and appealed.
The Montana Supreme Court held the speedy‑trial clock runs while formal charges are pending, paused while charges are dismissed, restarted at re‑filing, counted total delay as 277 days, applied the four‑factor test, and affirmed denial of dismissal (no speedy‑trial violation).

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
When does the speedy‑trial clock start/stop where charges are filed, dismissed, then re‑filed in another county?	State: clock starts at initial filing, stops on dismissal, restarts at re‑filing.	Butterfly: clock attached at initial accusation and should run through dismissal/re‑filing.	Clock runs only while formal charges are pending; time between dismissal and re‑filing is not counted.
Should the delay be measured as trigger for four‑factor test?	State: count total charged periods (Powell + Yellowstone) to trigger analysis.	Butterfly: count entire period from initial accusation including dismissal gap.	Court counted 123 days (Powell) + 154 days (Yellowstone) = 277 days, which triggers Ariegwe four‑factor balancing.
Attribution/weight of delay (reasons for delay)	State: much delay institutional; some delay attributable to defendant’s venue objection.	Butterfly: venue objection was his right; re‑filing delay is State’s responsibility.	Most delay characterized as institutional (State) but not bad faith; venue objection is neutral because both parties followed statutory process.
Prejudice from delay sufficient to violate speedy‑trial right?	Butterfly: continuous incarceration, loss of work, anxiety, costs — prejudiced by delay.	State: incarceration was from unrelated prior convictions; no oppressive pretrial incarceration and no impairment to defense.	No constitutional prejudice: incarceration not oppressive from this charge; no showing defense impaired; speedy‑trial claim fails.

Key Cases Cited

MacDonald v. United States, 456 U.S. 1 (Sup. Ct. 1982) (speedy‑trial protection does not attach during interval after dismissal when no charges pending)
United States v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302 (Sup. Ct. 1986) (reaffirming that speedy‑trial clause does not apply during periods with no outstanding indictment or actual restraint)
United States v. Avalos, 541 F.2d 1100 (5th Cir. 1976) (counts time between dismissals and re‑filings as part of speedy‑trial analysis in unusual transfer circumstances)
State v. Bailey, 201 Mont. 473 (Mont. 1982) (held delay between dismissed information and re‑filing should be counted; later overruled by Loud Hawk II rationale)
State v. Daniels, 248 Mont. 343 (Mont. 1991) (speedy‑trial right attached on petition in youth court later transferred to district court)
State v. Ariegwe, 338 Mont. 442 (Mont. 2007) (articulates the four‑factor speedy‑trial balancing test used in Montana)
State v. Zimmerman, 375 Mont. 374 (Mont. 2014) (standard of review and trigger date guidance for speedy‑trial analysis)
State v. Topp, 317 Mont. 59 (Mont. 2003) (dismissal and later re‑filing between justice and district court restarts speedy‑trial clock)