State v. Quigley, 883 N.W.2d 139

Background

Manager at McDonald’s complained that Karl Quigley was acting inappropriately with P.R., a minor; officers found nude photos/videos of P.R. on a phone linked to Quigley.
Officer Hamilton transported Quigley (uncuffed) to the station, placed him in a waiting room, and Quigley later was interviewed by Detective Melichar; Melichar told Quigley he was not under arrest and free to leave.
During the interview Quigley made admissions; later, while on probation, Quigley gave a written statement to his probation officer (marked non‑useable in criminal proceedings).
The DOC forwarded Quigley’s compelled statement to the DA, who directed Melichar to reinterview P.R.; P.R. then disclosed earlier incidents that prompted additional charges.
The circuit court denied suppression; Quigley pled no contest to counts in two consolidated cases and was sentenced. On appeal the court held Quigley was not in custody for Miranda purposes but found a Kastigar violation because P.R.’s reinterview traced to Quigley’s compelled, immunized DOC statement, vacating the plea.

Issues

Issue	Quigley’s Argument	State’s Argument	Held
Was Quigley "in custody" when Melichar interviewed him (Miranda trigger)?	He was effectively deprived of freedom (transported in squad car, isolated, told he had to come) so warnings were required.	He was told he was not under arrest and free to leave; interview was short, non‑confrontational, and he was not physically restrained.	Not in custody — objective factors (advice he was free to leave, lack of restraints, tone, duration) weighed against Miranda custody.
Was counsel ineffective for not moving to suppress pre‑Miranda statements?	Counsel’s failure was deficient and prejudiced him; suppression would have changed his decision to plead.	Any motion would have failed because Quigley was not in custody; no deficient performance or prejudice.	No ineffective assistance — suppression motion would have been denied, so counsel’s omission was not objectively unreasonable.
Did Quigley’s probation (DOC) statement require Kastigar immunity and exclusion?	His DOC statement was compelled (marked non‑useable); any derivative evidence (including P.R.’s reinterview) is barred.	The State conceded the DOC statement was compelled but argued P.R. would have been reinterviewed independently.	DOC statement was compelled; Kastigar applies. The State failed to show P.R.’s later statements came from a wholly independent source.
Was P.R.’s August 2012 reinterview an independent source (or derivative fruit of compelled testimony)?	The reinterview resulted from Quigley’s compelled DOC statement and thus is derivative and inadmissible.	The DA and detective would have reinterviewed P.R. regardless; any timing difference does not show derivative use.	Held derivative: State failed to document an investigation chain independent of the compelled statement; P.R.’s statements were fruits of the immunized testimony and must be suppressed.

Key Cases Cited

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (protects against compelled custodial interrogation without warnings)
Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (use and derivative‑use immunity required when testimony is compelled)
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (Fifth Amendment privilege applies to the States)
Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99 (custody defined by formal arrest or equivalent restraint; objective test)
J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261 (objective custody inquiry; risk of coercion in custodial interrogation)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (standard for ineffective assistance of counsel)
Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533 (independent source doctrine requires evidence actually discovered by lawful means)
Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n, 378 U.S. 52 (fruits of compelled testimony inadmissible against witness in criminal prosecution)
Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (historical statement on prohibition of using compelled testimony to find additional evidence)