State v. Quested
302 Kan. 262
| Kan. | 2015Background
- Joshua Quested pleaded guilty to multiple offenses in Saline County and had a related conviction in Dickinson County; plea agreement provided Saline sentences would run consecutive to the Dickinson sentence.
- Dickinson County judge sentenced Quested first; Saline County judge then imposed the agreed consecutive Saline sentences, suspended execution, and granted probation.
- Probation was later revoked; Quested was ordered to serve the underlying prison sentence and moved to correct an illegal sentence, arguing no Kansas statute authorizes consecutive sentences across separate cases in different counties.
- The district court denied the motion; the Court of Appeals affirmed relying on State v. Chronister; the Kansas Supreme Court granted review.
- The central legal question: whether a Kansas sentencing judge may order a sentence in one county to run consecutive to a previously imposed sentence in another Kansas county when no statute explicitly authorizes that situation.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Saline County judge had statutory authority to make Saline sentences consecutive to a previously imposed Dickinson County sentence | Quested: No Kansas statute expressly authorizes consecutive sentences across different counties/cases, so the order was illegal | State: Although no statute expressly authorizes it, precedent (Chronister) and judicial discretion support the sentencing judge’s authority | Court upheld Chronister: in absence of statutory prohibition and given historical/common‑law background and legislative acquiescence, a judge may order consecutive sentences across counties |
| Whether plea waiver bars claim that sentence is illegal | Quested: N/A (he raised legality claim) | State: Sentences were bargained for so appeal should be barred under plea‑agreement nonreviewability | Court: K.S.A. 22‑3504(1) allows correction of illegal sentences at any time; plea agreement does not waive legality challenge |
| Whether Kansas statutory scheme (KSGA/K.S.A. 21‑4608 / 21‑4720) precludes common‑law discretion to impose consecutive sentences outside their express text | Quested: Statutory language and precedent require explicit statutory authority; silence means no authority | State/Majority: Statutes do not expressly cover every scenario; statutory provisions limit but do not wholly displace common‑law discretion where consistent with legislative policy | Court: Statutory silence creates ambiguity; common‑law sentencing discretion survives unless clearly abrogated and supports Chronister’s rule |
| Whether In re W.H., Crawford, and Osbey mandate a contrary result | Quested: Those cases show sentencing is strictly statutory and common law cannot fill gaps | State/Majority: Those decisions are distinguishable (juvenile context, different statutory schemes) and do not overturn Chronister or longstanding precedent | Court: Distinguishing juvenile‑code cases and relying on historical practice and legislative acquiescence, Chronister remains controlling; Concurrence agrees with statutory construction rationale; dissents disagree |
Key Cases Cited
- Oregon v. Ice, 555 U.S. 160 (2009) (records historical common‑law judicial discretion to impose consecutive or concurrent sentences)
- Setser v. United States, 566 U.S. 231 (2012) (federal statutes construed against background of common‑law sentencing discretion; judges may order federal sentence consecutive to a yet‑to‑be‑imposed state sentence)
- State v. Chronister, 21 Kan. App. 2d 589 (1995) (Court of Appeals: sentencing judge may order a sentence consecutive to a sentence imposed in another Kansas county)
- State v. Reed, 237 Kan. 685 (1985) (discussing statutory amendments that made consecutive sentences mandatory in certain circumstances)
- In re W.H., 274 Kan. 813 (2002) (juvenile sentencing scheme lacks express authority for consecutive sentences; distinguishes adult KSGA and rejects importing common law into juvenile code)
- State v. Crawford, 39 Kan. App. 2d 897 (2008) (Court of Appeals: adult sentences cannot be made consecutive to juvenile adjudications where statutes do not authorize it)