201 Conn.App. 864
Conn. App. Ct.2020Background
- Police surveilled 356 Migeon Ave.; defendant (Qayyum) was observed arriving in a rental Infiniti and had frequently visited the residence prior to the search.
- During execution of a search warrant, officers found $267 in small bills, seven wax folds of heroin and two dubs of crack on Qayyum; a canine alerted on the rental car; Qayyum had rented cars costing ~$2,500–$2,600 in the months before arrest.
- Co-defendant Oscar Pugh had additional narcotics, paraphernalia, and a handwritten ledger; Pugh testified Qayyum used Pugh’s apartment to sell drugs in exchange for discounted drugs.
- The state called David Ricciuti (Dept. of Labor) to testify that Qayyum had no reportable wages for 2016–2017; Ricciuti acknowledged unreported income sources (under‑the‑table work, business income, SSDI, rentals, lottery).
- The state also presented expert testimony from Detective Scott Flockhart about general indicators police consider when deciding to charge possession with intent to sell (packaging, quantities, paraphernalia, money, use of intermediaries, rental cars); the prosecutor avoided asking for a direct opinion on whether Qayyum intended to sell.
- Jury convicted Qayyum of conspiracy to sell narcotics and two counts of possession with intent to sell; he appealed raising (1) due process/burden‑shifting claim over Ricciuti’s testimony and (2) improper expert opinion on intent.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Qayyum) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admission of Dept. of Labor testimony that defendant had no reportable wages | Testimony is admissible evidentiary proof (relevant to motive/intent/means); not unduly prejudicial when considered with other evidence | Testimony shifts burden to defendant to prove legitimate income and violates due process; prejudicial and plays on bias | Admission was evidentiary, not constitutional; court did not abuse discretion admitting it; even if error, harmless given strength of other evidence |
| Expert testimony about indicia of intent to sell (Detective Flockhart) | Expert may testify to general behaviors and indicia of trafficking; prosecutor did not elicit an opinion on the ultimate issue | Testimony improperly opined on the ultimate issue (intent to sell) and invaded jury’s role | Court did not abuse discretion: testimony described general factors (permissible); prosecutor avoided asking ultimate‑issue opinion; any error would be harmless |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Perry, 58 Conn. App. 65 (Conn. App. 2000) (financial condition evidence may be admissible to prove motive or related issues)
- State v. Rosa, 104 Conn. App. 374 (Conn. App. 2007) (standard for relevance vs. undue prejudice for employment/financial evidence)
- State v. Vilalastra, 207 Conn. 35 (Conn. 1988) (police experts may testify about typical conduct of drug dealers and similar acts)
- State v. Nelson, 17 Conn. App. 556 (Conn. App. 1989) (expert testimony about quantity, packaging, and practices of dealers is permissible)
- Hodges v. Commissioner of Correction, 187 Conn. App. 394 (Conn. App. 2019) (expert opinion on an ultimate issue is sometimes allowed when the trier needs expert assistance)
- State v. Alexis, 194 Conn. App. 162 (Conn. App. 2019) (nonconstitutional evidentiary errors reviewed for harmlessness considering witness importance and overall case strength)