State v. Purcell
203 A.3d 542
Conn.2019Background
- Victim (defendant’s nephew by marriage) alleged sexual misconduct spanning 2010–2013; photos on the victim’s Nintendo DS prompted investigation and police involvement.
- Purcell was arrested on multiple warrants and, after Miranda warnings and a written waiver, was custodially interrogated by Wallingford detectives Zerella and Fairbrother.
- During interrogation Purcell made conditional/ambiguous references to his lawyer (e.g., “if my lawyer was here…we could talk,” “I’m supposed to have my lawyer here”), then agreed to talk and made statements later used at trial.
- Purcell moved to suppress post‑invocation statements; trial court denied suppression (finding no unambiguous request for counsel); jury convicted Purcell of three counts of risk of injury to a child.
- Appellate Court affirmed under the federal standard of Davis v. United States; this certified appeal raised (1) whether Purcell invoked his right to counsel under Davis, and (2) whether Connecticut’s constitution requires a stop‑and‑clarify rule for ambiguous requests for counsel.
- Connecticut Supreme Court: found Purcell’s statements were not an unambiguous invocation under Davis (federal law) but held Connecticut’s article first, § 8 requires a stop‑and‑clarify prophylactic rule; failure to clarify violated state constitutional rights and warranted a new trial.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Purcell) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Purcell’s statements were an unambiguous invocation of right to counsel under Davis | Statements were ambiguous/conditional and did not reasonably communicate a present desire for counsel | Purcell argued his references to counsel effectively invoked right to counsel, requiring cessation | Court: Not an unambiguous invocation under Davis; officers not required by federal standard to stop |
| Whether Connecticut constitution (art. I, § 8) requires police to stop and clarify ambiguous/equivocal requests for counsel | Appellate Court: Davis governs; state constitution doesn’t require additional protection | Purcell: State constitution requires more protective prophylactic rule (stop‑and‑clarify) to safeguard privilege against self‑incrimination | Court: Adopted stop‑and‑clarify under Connecticut constitution; ambiguous invocation requires clarifying, limited questions or termination |
| Whether officers’ conduct was harmless or shielded by good‑faith reliance on federal precedent | State: Officers acted reasonably under Davis; suppression unnecessary; good‑faith reliance | Purcell: Violation was harmful; state must prove harmless beyond reasonable doubt; good‑faith exception not applicable under state law | Court: No good‑faith exception; state made no harmlessness showing; violation was harmful; suppression warranted remedial relief (new trial) |
| Scope of permissible clarification after equivocal invocation | State: Clarification not constitutionally required; further questioning permitted under Davis unless clear request | Purcell: Clarifying questions are narrow, non‑coercive and required before continuing | Court: Clarifying questions permitted but must be narrow, ministerial, non‑adversarial; officers may instead state they will stop unless defendant clearly waives counsel |
Key Cases Cited
- Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 (1994) (federal rule requiring an unambiguous request for counsel to trigger cessation of interrogation)
- Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (establishing warnings and right to counsel during custodial interrogation)
- Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981) (prophylactic rule barring further interrogation after an invoked right to counsel)
- Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146 (1990) (reinforcing that questioning cannot continue after invocation of counsel absent attorney presence)
- Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523 (1987) (discussing Miranda prophylaxis and the nature of state protections; cited for context on access to counsel)