State v. Purcell
166 A.3d 883
| Conn. App. Ct. | 2017Background
- Defendant Robert J. Purcell was tried by jury on multiple counts arising from alleged sexual misconduct with a minor relative; convicted of three counts of risk of injury to a child and acquitted on several sexual‑assault counts. Sentence: effective 16 years (execution suspended after 9) and 10 years probation. Appeal followed.
- At trial the victim’s mother, while describing the child’s medical conditions, volunteered that the child had been diagnosed with post‑traumatic stress disorder (PTSD); defense moved for a mistrial. The court excused the witness, discussed remedy with counsel, denied mistrial, and gave a strong curative instruction directing the jury to ignore the PTSD remark.
- Defendant moved to suppress statements he made during a custodial police interview. During interrogation he referenced counsel: e.g., “See, if my lawyer was here, I’d … we could talk” and “I’m supposed to have my lawyer here. You know that,” but continued speaking after detectives invited him to proceed.
- Trial court denied the mistrial motion and denied suppression; defendant appealed arguing (1) PTSD testimony was harmful and could not be cured by instruction, and (2) his references to counsel were clear invocations requiring cessation of questioning under Edwards v. Arizona or, alternatively, that the Connecticut Constitution (art. I, § 8) requires officers to cease and clarify ambiguous requests for counsel.
- Appellate court affirmed: held the curative instruction was adequate and the PTSD remark was harmless; held defendant did not clearly and unequivocally invoke the right to counsel so Edwards did not require cessation; and declined to adopt a broader state‑constitutional “cease‑and‑clarify” rule, applying the Geisler factors and following federal precedent.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the mother’s testimony that the victim was diagnosed with PTSD required a mistrial | PTSD remark prejudicially endorsed victim’s credibility and defendant’s guilt; not curable by instruction | Testimony was isolated; curative instruction would and did neutralize any prejudice | Denied mistrial; isolated remark cured by strong instruction; harmless error standard met |
| Whether defendant’s statements invoking counsel during custodial interrogation were a clear invocation of the right to counsel under Edwards | N/A (state contended interrogation was proper) | Statements (“See, if my lawyer was here…”, “I’m supposed to have my lawyer here…”) were clear and unequivocal invocations, requiring cessation until counsel present | Not a clear, unambiguous invocation; reasonable officer would not have understood them as an invocation; denial of suppression proper |
| Whether, under Connecticut Constitution (art. I, § 8), police must cease questioning and clarify ambiguous references to counsel (a state constitutional claim) | N/A | Even ambiguous references required police to stop and clarify under state constitution (cease‑and‑clarify) | Declined to extend state constitution beyond federal rule; no duty to clarify ambiguous references; Geisler analysis supports aligning with federal law |
| Whether to exercise supervisory authority to impose a cease‑and‑clarify rule on law enforcement | N/A | Requested supervisory rule to require clarification by officers | Declined to use supervisory power; such rule would intrude on law enforcement practices and depart from established precedent |
Key Cases Cited
- Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (recognizes that once a suspect requests counsel, police must cease questioning unless counsel is provided or suspect reinitiates)
- Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 (requires an unambiguous request for counsel; ambiguous references do not obligate officers to stop questioning)
- Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (establishes advisement of rights and right to counsel during custodial interrogation)
- Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98 (clarifies Edwards’ scope and discusses prophylactic nature of rule)
- State v. Stoddard, 206 Conn. 157 (Connecticut case addressing police duties regarding counsel contacting a suspect; limited to interference with attorney‑client relationship)
- State v. Ferrell, 191 Conn. 37 (Connecticut recognition of the constitutional significance of Miranda under state law)
- State v. Lockhart, 298 Conn. 552 (Connecticut precedent holding state self‑incrimination and due process clauses coextensive with federal counterparts)