706 S.E.2d 513
S.C. Ct. App.2011Background
- On May 1, 2002, Corporal Owens stopped a 1997 Ford Expedition on I-85 in Greenville County for a tailgating violation and a burned-out tag light.
- Provet exhibited visibly nervous behavior—shaking hands and accelerated breathing—and the vehicle appeared to contain many air fresheners; registration was held by a third party.
- Owens questioned Provet about his origin, destination, the Holiday Inn, employment, and the vehicle’s third-party registration; Provet supplied inconsistent answers.
- Aman, the drug-detection canine handler, was summoned after Owens developed the belief that Provet was deceptive; a vehicle search followed Provet’s consent, and Provet fled across six lanes when officers attempted to remove a bag.
- Provet was apprehended; a drug-detection canine alerted to cocaine in a fast-food bag; Provet was indicted for resisting arrest and trafficking cocaine; the trial court denied suppression of the cocaine evidence and convicted Provet.
- The appellate court affirmed, upholding the traffic stop, detention, and consent-based search under Fourth Amendment standards.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the detention during the traffic stop was unreasonably prolonged. | Provet argues the questioning extended the stop beyond its scope. | Owens contends questions were tangential and did not measurably extend the stop. | Detention not unreasonably extended; questions were tangential and total stop under eleven minutes. |
| Whether there was reasonable suspicion to justify further detention. | Provet contends insufficient indicators of criminal activity. | Owens had objective, particularized reasons; totality of circumstances supports detention. | Reasonable suspicion existed based on nervousness, travel anomalies, luggage absence, multiple air fresheners, and inconsistent stories. |
| Whether Provet voluntarily consented to the vehicle search. | Provet challenges voluntariness of consent. | Consent was given and supported by total circumstances. | Consent was voluntary under the totality of the circumstances; no coercion or promises shown. |
Key Cases Cited
- Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323 (124 S. Ct. 2533 (2009)) (police inquiries unrelated to stop do not extend seizure duration)
- State v. Pichardo, 367 S.C. 84 (Ct. App. 2005) (voluntariness and totality of circumstances govern consent to search)
- Tindall, 388 S.C. 518 (698 S.E.2d 203 (2010)) (continued detention after stop may render search invalid; factors matter for reasonable suspicion)
- Rivera, 384 S.C. 356 (682 S.E.2d 307 (Ct. App. 2009)) (questioning during stop related to purpose; insufficiency of suspicion when luggage absent)
- United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1 (109 S. Ct. 1581 (1989)) (totality of circumstances governs reasonable suspicion)
- United States v. Mason, 628 F.3d 123 (4th Cir. 2010) (examines corroborative factors in reasonable suspicion)
