State v. Prophet, 507 P.3d 735

At ~4:00 p.m., an Oregon State trooper found defendant asleep in a running car and observed signs of impairment; after field sobriety testing, defendant became agitated.
Trooper Held informed defendant she was under arrest for DUI; defendant stiffened, pulled her arm away, screamed, and resisted placement of handcuffs.
With assistance, officers used a modified arm-bar to subdue and handcuff defendant; as they walked her to the patrol car she dragged her feet and had to be carried.
A search incident to arrest recovered drug paraphernalia positive for methamphetamine; defendant was charged with possession and resisting arrest (ORS 162.315).
At trial defendant requested a jury instruction that conviction for resisting arrest requires proof she acted “with a conscious objective to create a substantial risk of physical injury”; the trial court refused and convicted her of resisting arrest.
On appeal the court affirmed, holding that although the element of creating a substantial risk of injury requires a culpable mental state, legislative history rebuts the presumption that that mental state is "intentionally." The court therefore declined to require proof that defendant intended to create the risk.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether ORS 162.315 requires proof that the defendant intentionally created a substantial risk of physical injury to convict for resisting arrest	"Intentionally" in the statute modifies only the conduct of resisting (use/threatened use of force); legislative history shows intent element targets preventing arrest, not creation of risk	The statutory "intentionally" applies to each nonprocedural element; default culpability rules require a mental state for the risk element, so it must be intentional	The risk element is a material element that requires a culpable mental state, but legislative text and history rebut the presumption that that state is "intentionally." The trial court did not err; conviction affirmed

State v. Owen, 369 Or 288 (clarifies that an explicit statutory mens rea applies to each nonprocedural element unless legislative intent indicates otherwise)
State v. Simonov, 358 Or 531 (default rules for associating mens rea with conduct, result, and circumstance elements)
State v. Haltom, 366 Or 791 (core principles for applying culpability rules and legislative-intent analysis)
State v. Blanton, 284 Or 591 (early discussion distinguishing elements that define forbidden conduct from procedural matters)
State v. Rainoldi, 351 Or 486 (legislative intent and scope of mental-state requirements in criminal statutes)
State v. Olive, 259 Or App 104 (legislative history of ORS 162.315 and explanation of statute drafting)
State v. Remsh, 221 Or App 471 (discusses "resists" definition as containing means and end components)
State v. Schodrow, 187 Or App 224 (analysis on how an explicit mens rea term applies to statutory elements)