State v. Prince
226 Ariz. 516
| Ariz. | 2011Background
- Prince was convicted of first degree murder of Cassandra and attempted first degree murder of Christine after a domestic dispute.
- A prior capital-sentencing judgment was remanded for resentencing under Ring v. Arizona, with aggravators found in the resentencing proceeding.
- Two aggravating factors were found: especially cruel murder (F6) and Cassandra was under 15 when killed (F9).
- During a second penalty-phase, the statute § 13-752(K) required a new jury if the first penalty-phase jury deadlocked, and the new jury could not retry guilt or the previously found aggravators.
- Prince challenged the second penalty-phase process as ex post facto and vague, and argued trifurcated proceedings, juror exclusion, evidentiary issues, and victim-impact testimony; the court upheld the death sentence.
- Independent review affirmed the death sentence given the strength of aggravation and weak mitigation.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ex post facto violation from § 13-752(K) | Prince argues second jury retrying death sentence expands liability beyond 1990 law. | State contends Cropper controls; no new liability; not ex post facto. | No ex post facto violation; second penalty phase permissible. |
| Vagueness of § 13-752(K) governing second penalty phase | Prince claims lack of guidance on admissibility of aggravation evidence at second phase. | Statutes broadly govern penalty-phase evidence by relevance to mitigation; admissibility rules apply. | Statutes adequately guide admissibility; no void-for-vagueness error. |
| Constitutionality of trifurcated jury proceeding | Tri-phase process may deprive defendant of cohesive sentencing. | Different juries for guilt/aggravation/penalty are permissible; no Caldwell violation. | Tri-furcated proceeding constitutional; juries properly instructed. |
| Victim impact evidence and Caldwell analysis | Victim impact and statements risk improper prejudice and Caldwell violation. | Victim impact evidence is allowed under Payne; readings by advocates do not violate confrontation or Caldwell. | Victim impact evidence and related readings did not violate Caldwell or due process; penalty upheld. |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Cropper, 223 Ariz. 522 (2010) (ex post facto challenges to second penalty-phase procedure)
- State v. Moore, 222 Ariz. 1 (2009) (upholding bifurcated aggravation/penalty phases)
- State v. Ellison, 213 Ariz. 116 (2006) (due process and mitigation guidance in penalty phase)
- State v. Chappell, 225 Ariz. 229 (2010) (special cruelty standard and time considerations)
- Marsh v. Kansas, 548 U.S. 163 (2006) (requires reasoned, individualized sentencing; death penalty discretion)
- State v. Hargrave, 225 Ariz. 1 (2010) (guidance on narrowing instructions for especial cruelty)
- State v. Tucker, 215 Ariz. 298 (2007) (limiting or guiding introduction of psychological evidence)
- State v. Bocharski, 218 Ariz. 476 (2008) (relevant discussion of mitigating weight and childhood factors)
- State v. Newell, 212 Ariz. 389 (2006) (standard for evaluating mitigating evidence and weight)
