State v. Prince
1710010993A
Del. Super. Ct.Jan 24, 2022Background
- On October 18, 2017, Radee Prince killed three coworkers in Maryland earlier that day, then traveled to Delaware and shot Rashan (Jason) Baul multiple times; Baul survived but suffered long-term injuries. Surveillance videos captured both the Maryland and Delaware shootings.
- At trial Prince admitted he shot Baul but asserted self-defense and, alternatively, extreme emotional distress; the jury acquitted on attempted murder and convicted on attempted manslaughter under extreme emotional distress and related weapons/resisting counts.
- The State introduced evidence (including video) of the Maryland homicides to prove Prince’s state of mind; Prince had invoked the Fifth at trial when questioned about the Maryland shootings.
- Prince filed a pro se Rule 61 post-conviction motion raising prosecutorial misconduct (Brady-type), multiple ineffective-assistance-of-counsel (IAC) claims (investigation/impeachment of ballistics expert, failure to object to prosecutorial remarks, edited video, insanity-notice, prior dropped charges, sentencing memo), and trial-court errors; many claims had been raised on direct appeal.
- The Superior Court applied Rule 61 procedural bars to claims previously raised or that could have been raised on direct appeal, and on the merits rejected the remaining IAC claims under Strickland as either not deficient or not prejudicial; the Rule 61 motion was summarily dismissed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Prince) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility of Maryland-shooting evidence | Evidence admissible to show state of mind; properly limited to that purpose | Admission was unfairly prejudicial and should have been excluded | Previously litigated on direct appeal; claim barred by Rule 61(i)(4) and rejected on appeal |
| Prosecutorial misconduct (Brady re: ballistics expert Carl Rone) | No Brady violation that would change outcome; Rone did not testify and replacement analyst reached same conclusion | State withheld impeachment information about Rone’s misconduct/indictment | Procedurally defaulted (could have been raised on appeal) and, on the merits, speculative and not prejudicial given replacement analyst’s identical findings |
| IAC — failure to investigate/impeach ballistics evidence and chain-of-custody | Even if Rone impeached, a second analyst testified to the same match; chain-of-custody was adequately established | Counsel should have investigated Rone and moved to exclude firearm evidence | No prejudice: second analyst’s testimony and sufficient authentication made exclusion/favorable outcome not reasonably probable; raising futile arguments is not ineffective |
| IAC — failure to object to prosecutor’s closing remark that three victims died in Maryland | Summation was within permissible argument about state of mind; video showed shootings | Counsel should have objected because jury only saw shootings and may not have known deaths occurred | No Strickland prejudice: the Maryland videos and facts were before jury; any mention of deaths was not likely outcome-determinative |
| IAC — discrepancy/"edited" Delaware auto-shop video provided to Prince | State: trial video authenticated and established facts; minor differences do not affect guilt | Counsel gave Prince an edited copy and failed to protect against altered evidence | No prejudice shown; whether three or four shots fired did not change outcome and Prince admitted the shooting |
| IAC — counsel filed insanity notice without consent / mental-health strategy | Notice preserved possible defense; counsel declined to pursue insanity at trial based on psychiatric reports | Counsel asserted insanity without Prince’s permission and harmed defense | No prejudice: notice was withdrawn/unused; counsel reasonably pursued extreme emotional distress (which produced the best available verdict) |
| IAC — failure to object to sentencing memorandum and prior nolle prosequi references | Sentencing memo is advocacy; Court did not rely on unproven facts and had discretion | Memo contained false/misleading timeline and references to dropped charges | No prejudice: redacted materials did not negate evidence of prior firearm possession; sentencing court exercised discretion and did not base sentence on unproven facts |
Key Cases Cited
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two-prong ineffective-assistance standard: deficiency and prejudice)
- Green v. State, 238 A.3d 160 (Del. 2020) (ineffective-assistance principles and when Rule 61 bars may be inapplicable to IAC claims)
- Ploof v. State, 75 A.3d 811 (Del. 2013) (procedural limitations on postconviction relief under Rule 61)
- Swan v. State, 248 A.3d 839 (Del. 2021) (prejudice requirement under Strickland and standards for summary dismissal)
- Bailey v. State, 588 A.2d 1121 (Del. 1991) (Rule 61 as a procedural device and related limitations)
- Shockley v. State, 565 A.2d 1373 (Del. 1989) (ineffective-assistance framework and deference to trial strategy)
- Reed v. State, 258 A.3d 807 (Del. 2021) (recognition of right to effective assistance of counsel)