State v. Prieto-Rubio, 359 Or. 16

A (age 12) reported on Aug 8, 2011 that Prieto‑Rubio sexually abused her; police arrested him and he retained counsel for that charge.
Detective Rookhuyzen later interviewed Prieto‑Rubio in jail about two other nieces (K and L) without notifying or allowing Prieto‑Rubio’s counsel to attend; Prieto‑Rubio waived Miranda and made incriminating statements about K and L.
The state charged Prieto‑Rubio for conduct involving K and L and moved to consolidate those charges with the earlier A charge; the trial court granted consolidation.
Prieto‑Rubio moved to suppress the uncounseled statements about K and L under Article I, §11 of the Oregon Constitution; the trial court denied suppression and convicted him following a bench trial.
The Oregon Court of Appeals reversed, applying a “factually related” test; the Oregon Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals, adopting an objective foreseeability test and remanding for further proceedings.

Issue	Petitioner (State) Argument	Respondent (Prieto‑Rubio) Argument	Held
Whether Article I, §11 forbids police from questioning a defendant who has counsel on one charged offense about other uncharged offenses without notifying counsel	Right‑to‑counsel protection is limited to interrogation about the same criminal episode; police may question about separate offenses occurring at different times/places	Right attaches where it is reasonably foreseeable that questioning about uncharged matters will elicit incriminating information about the charged offense (i.e., when matters are factually related)	Article I, §11 bars questioning when it is objectively reasonably foreseeable to the questioner that the questioning will elicit incriminating information about the offense for which the defendant has counsel; here questioning about K and L was foreseeably likely to implicate the charged A offense, so suppression was required

State v. Sparklin, 296 Or 85 (Or. 1983) (discussed scope of Article I, §11 and held police may not interrogate about events "surrounding" the charged crime without notifying counsel)
Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162 (U.S. 2001) (Sixth Amendment is offense‑specific; rejected an inextricably‑intertwined exception for uncharged offenses)
Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (U.S. 1977) (police elicitation of information related to uncharged conduct can implicate the Sixth Amendment)
State v. Randant, 341 Or 64 (Or. 2006) (Article I, §11 right to counsel attaches after charging and limits police questioning about the charged offense)
Jewell v. State, 957 N.E.2d 625 (Ind. 2011) (interpreting a state‑constitutional right to counsel to forbid questioning about uncharged conduct when it is objectively foreseeable questioning will affect the charged offense)
State v. Dinsmore, 342 Or 1 (Or. 2006) (remedy for Article I, §11 violation is exclusion of prejudicially obtained evidence)