State v. Price
2013 Ohio 1542
Ohio Ct. App.2013Background
- Price was convicted by jury of rape, kidnapping, and telecommunications harassment; conviction for rape and kidnapping later challenged as to trial communications and sentencing merger; key issue concerns Doyle-impeachment implications for post-arrest silence and consent defense timing; detective testimony tied Price’s silence to alleged untruthfulness; pretext-call recording showed Price denying rape during investigation; price argued Miranda violations tainted impeachment and trial strategy; court reversed and remanded for new trial, avoiding consideration of ineffective assistance and merger issues.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Doyle v. Ohio prohibits impeachment by post-arrest silence | Price argues Doyle bars silence-based impeachment after Miranda warnings | State contends silent statements can be used if not induced by government action | Plain error; Doyle violation established; reversal and remand |
| Whether testimony drawing inferences from Price’s consent defense timing violated Doyle | Price asserts detective exploited silence to imply dishonesty | State relied on silence timing to attack credibility | Plain error; Doyle violation; reversal and remand |
| Whether the post-Miranda statements were admissible or tainted by a Miranda violation | Statements post-Miranda could be admissible if not used to impeach silence | State used statements to exploit silence rather than inconsistencies | Assumed admissible but ultimately found Doyle violation; reversal and remand |
| Whether sentencing should merge rape and kidnapping convictions (and related mootness) | Price seeks merger of rape and kidnapping convictions | State argues no merger issue survives reversal | Moot due to reversal; not resolved on appeal |
Key Cases Cited
- Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976) (improper to impeach post-arrest silence after Miranda warnings)
- Wainwright v. Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284 (1986) ( Miranda silence protection applies to impeachment)
- Anderson v. Charles, 447 U.S. 404 (1980) (voluntary statements after Miranda may be questioned for consistency)
- Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603 (1982) (pre- and post-Miranda silence rules; pre-arrest silence admissible in some contexts)
- Jaradat v. Williams, 591 F.3d 863 (6th Cir. 2010) (Doyle-type violation when silence is exploited to imply falsehood)
- State v. Campbell, 69 Ohio St.3d 38 (1994) (waiver considerations for suppression issues)
- Osborne v. Ohio, 50 Ohio St.2d 211 (1977) (voluntary post-Miranda statements admissible)
- Pepin-McCaffrey v. State, 186 Ohio App.3d 548 (2010) (no duty to disclose affirmative defense timing)