State v. Preston, 2011 ME 98

Preston confronted victim on power line trail, demanded he turn around, threatened to shoot, and victim proceeded despite no trespass signs.
Preston later exited his trailer with a gun and fired, while victim fled, hearing multiple gunshots and taking cover.
Girlfriend testified Preston fired at the woodpile because victim was a thief and Preston feared theft of tools and marijuana plants.
Preston was charged with reckless conduct with a dangerous weapon and criminal threatening with a dangerous weapon; he was convicted of the latter and acquitted of the former.
Trial court instructed about defense of premises and deadly force definitions; no objections were raised to jury instructions.
Preston appealed alleging vagueness of deadly force/defense of premises definitions and improper jury instructions; the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether deadly force is unconstitutionally vague as applied	Preston argues vague direction element	State defends statutory definition within context	Not unconstitutionally vague; reasonable application to facts supports conviction
Whether jury instructions adequately defined deadly force and related terms	Court failed to define threat vs. deadly force, and lesser offense	Instructions, viewed as a whole, were sufficient; no obvious error	No obvious error; instructions adequate in context; no failure to define use of a dangerous weapon; no required lesser-included instruction

State v. Burdick, 782 A.2d 319 (Me. 2001) (obvious error standard for deficient instructions under Rule 52(b))
State v. McLaughlin, 794 A.2d 69 (Me. 2002) (statutory vagueness review requires notice to proscribed conduct)
State v. Aboda, 8 A.3d 719 (Me. 2010) (vagueness analysis in context of case; not every ambiguity rises to void-for-vagueness)
State v. Martin, 916 A.2d 961 (Me. 2007) (deadly force definition need not mirror exact code language)
State v. Witham, 876 A.2d 40 (Me. 2005) (contextual application of statutory definitions in case)
State v. Cannell, 916 A.2d 231 (Me. 2007) (failure to instruct on justification when gun used nonlethally can be error)
State v. Day, 724 A.2d 1245 (Me. 1999) (instructional adequacy assessed by overall charge)
State v. Bennett, 416 A.2d 720 (Me. 1980) (discretion to instruct on lesser-included offenses)
State v. Finnemore, 690 A.2d 979 (Me. 1997) (inconsistent verdicts not automatically reversible)
State v. Williams, 433 A.2d 765 (Me. 1981) (threat without actual firing distinguished from deadly force)
State v. Lord, 617 A.2d 536 (Me. 1992) (threat of deadly force distinct from actual deadly force)