State v. Prado, 299 Kan. 1251

Background

Prado was charged with aggravated indecent liberties (single count) but entered into a plea agreement to plead no contest to two rape-of-child counts (off-grid Jessica’s Law exposures) in exchange for the State’s recommendation of consecutive on-grid terms (two 147-month sentences) instead of a presumptive hard-25 life sentence.
The plea colloquy occurred with Prado using an interpreter; the court accepted the pleas after finding them voluntary and Prado expressed satisfaction with counsel at that hearing.
At sentencing three months later Prado, through an interpreter, said his attorney “has not explained things properly to me” and expressed confusion about the amended charges (touching v. rape) and the plea’s benefit.
Defense counsel summarized Prado’s complaint as a claim that counsel did not explain the nature of the charges and then counseled the court that he did not see a conflict and did not move to withdraw as counsel.
The district court allowed Prado to speak, found no good cause to withdraw the plea, proceeded to sentence consistent with the plea agreement, and denied Prado’s later motion to withdraw plea.
The Kansas Supreme Court majority held the district court should have made further inquiry into a potential conflict, that Prado was denied conflict-free counsel for the plea-withdrawal hearing (violating the Sixth Amendment), reversed the denial, vacated the sentence, and remanded for a new hearing with conflict-free counsel.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Prado)	Defendant's Argument (State)	Held
Whether district court erred by not further inquiring into alleged conflict between Prado and counsel at plea-withdrawal hearing	Prado said counsel didn’t explain the plea; counsel confirmed lack of communication — this alerted court to a potential conflict requiring inquiry	State: statements were about the nature of the plea (not counsel performance) and did not require further inquiry; Prado didn’t request substitute counsel	Court: The combined statements from Prado and counsel triggered the duty to inquire; failure to do so was abuse of discretion
Whether Prado was denied Sixth Amendment right to conflict-free counsel at the plea-withdrawal hearing	Prado needed conflict-free counsel because counsel’s interests/position (counsel advocated against withdrawing) conflicted with Prado’s motion	State: no clear conflict; district court’s colloquy with Prado satisfied inquiry duty	Court: Prado was entitled to conflict-free counsel because the record showed an actual conflict; prejudice presumed
Appropriate remedy for district court’s failure to inquire	Prado seeks vacatur and a new hearing with new counsel	State argues the record does not show a constitutional violation and urges affirmance	Court: Reverse denial of motion to withdraw plea, vacate sentence, remand for new hearing with conflict-free counsel
Whether the record demonstrated an actual conflict (so prejudice is presumed)	Prado asserts counsel’s advocacy against plea withdrawal shows an actual conflict that adversely affected representation	Dissent: record shows misunderstanding of charges not ineffective assistance; existence of potential conflict doesn’t automatically prove adverse effect	Court majority: record demonstrates an actual conflict; adverse effect and prejudice are presumed

Key Cases Cited

State v. Taylor, 266 Kan. 967 (1999) (court must inquire when aware of possible conflict; without conflict-free counsel defendant has no meaningful opportunity to show good cause to withdraw plea)
State v. Vann, 280 Kan. 782 (2006) (failure to inquire into known potential conflict is abuse of discretion; remedy typically remand to determine adverse effect)
State v. Sharkey, 299 Kan. 87 (2014) (simply allowing defendant to speak is insufficient inquiry; discusses when conflicts compel further investigation)
State v. Hulett, 293 Kan. 312 (2011) (Sixth Amendment right to conflict-free counsel extends to postconviction proceedings where state is represented)
State v. Galaviz, 296 Kan. 168 (2012) (duty to inquire arises when court knows or should know of potential conflict)
State v. Williams, 290 Kan. 1050 (2010) (distinguishes complaints about plea substance from complaints about counsel’s performance for triggering inquiry)
State v. Gleason, 277 Kan. 624 (2004) (remand appropriate to determine whether conflict adversely affected counsel’s performance)
Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162 (2002) (actual conflict is one that adversely affects counsel’s performance; when actual conflict exists prejudice may be presumed)
United States v. Davis, 239 F.3d 283 (2d Cir. 2001) (when a conflict surfaces, appointment of new counsel may be required; remand can be needed to assess adverse effect)