State v. Porter
241 Or. App. 26
| Or. Ct. App. | 2011Background
- Porter was convicted on three counts of using a child in a display of sexually explicit conduct under ORS 163.670.
- He challenged the denial of his judgment of acquittal, arguing the State failed to prove he “permitted” a child to participate for observers or to be recorded.
- Facts viewed in the State’s favor show D, a 15-year-old, lived in a house with Porter and others in early 2007.
- Leblanc-Porter and Davies sexually abused D in numerous ways; Porter was present in the room during some occurrences and appeared to enjoy watching the abuse.
- The alleged conduct occurred in common areas of the house; the adults were present while the abuse happened, though Porter did not actively participate.
- The court discussed ORS 163.670’s purpose to prevent child sexual abuse and analyzed whether “permit” means authority over the child or a broader meaning.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Meaning of 'permits' in ORS 163.670 | Porter argues 'permit' requires legal authority over the child. | Pyritz framework limits liability to those with authority over the victim. | No; 'permits' is broader, meaning allow or make possible. |
| Sufficiency of evidence under 'permits' | Evidence showed Porter watched and enjoyed the abuse, suggesting he permitted it. | Lacks authority over D negates liability under 'permitting'. | Sufficient evidence that Porter permitted D's participation. |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Reiland, 153 Or.App. 601, 958 P.2d 900 (1998) (interpreted 'permit' to include synonyms like 'allow' in child-endangerment context)
- State v. Pyritz, 90 Or.App. 601, 752 P.2d 1310 (1988) (broad meaning of 'permit' as allow by tacit consent or by not hindering)
- State v. Stoneman, 323 Or. 536, 920 P.2d 535 (1996) (contextual framework for child-sex offenses and underlying harms)
- Lemery v. Leonard, 99 Or. 670, 196 P. 376 (1905) (historical broad/conceptual understanding of 'permit')